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ALIGNING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 
 
100 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) 
 
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos* 
 
 
Campaign finance law is in crisis. In a series of recent decisions, the 
Supreme Court has rejected state interests such as anti-distortion and equality, 
while narrowing the anti-corruption interest to its quid pro quo core. This core 
cannot sustain the bulk of campaign finance regulation. As a result, an array of 
contribution limits, expenditure limits, and public financing programs have been 
struck down by the Court. If any meaningful rules are to survive, a new interest 
capable of justifying them must be found. 
This Article introduces just such an interest: the alignment of voters’ policy 
preferences with their government’s policy outputs. Alignment is a value of deep 
democratic significance. If it is achieved, then voters’ views are heeded, not 
ignored, by their elected representatives. Alignment also is distinct from the 
interests the Court previously has rebuffed. In particular, alignment and equality 
are separate concepts because equal voter influence is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for alignment to arise. And there is reason to think the Court 
might be drawn to alignment. In decisions spanning several decades, the Court 
often has affirmed that public policy ought to reflect the wishes of the people. 
It is not enough, though, if alignment is merely an appealing value. For it to 
justify regulation, money in politics must be able to produce misalignment, and 
campaign finance reform must be able to promote alignment. The Article draws 
on a new wave of political science scholarship to establish both propositions. 
This work shows that individual donors are ideologically polarized, while parties 
and PACs are more centrist in their giving. The work also finds that politicians 
tend to adhere to the same positions as their principal funders. Accordingly, 
policies that curb the influence of individual donors would be valid under the 
alignment approach. But measures that burden more moderate entities could not 
be sustained on this basis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“You have some ideological extremist who has a big bankroll and they can 
entirely skew our politics.” 
 
– Barack Obama, Press Conference by the President (Oct. 8, 2013) 
 
Here are some facts about money and politics in today’s America. At the 
federal level, campaign spending totaled $7.3 billion in 2012.1 Almost all of this 
funding came from individual donors, not corporations or unions.2 Individuals 
gave about half of their contributions to specific candidates, a quarter to political 
parties, and a quarter to PACs and Super PACs.3 These donors were in no way 
1 See FEC Summarizes Campaign Activity of the 2011-2012 Election Cycle, FED. ELECTION COMM’N 
(Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2013/20130419_2012-24m-Summary.shtml [hereinafter FEC 
2012 Summary] (2012 spending by entities disclosing donors totaled $7.0 billion); 2012 Outside Spending, by 
Group, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012& 
disp=O&type=U&chrt=D (last visited Aug. 1, 2014) (2012 spending by entities not disclosing donors totaled 
$311 million). 
2 See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 105, 109 (2003) (“It is evident that individuals, rather than organizations, are by far the most 
important source of campaign funds.”); Adam Bonica, Avenues of Influence: On the Political Expenditures of 
Corporations and Their Directors and Executives 10-11 (Dec. 3, 2013) (disclosed corporate spending totaled 
only $75 million and disclosed union spending only $105 million in 2012). 
3 See FEC 2012 Summary, supra note 1. PAC stands for Political Action Committee. Conventional PACs 
may contribute to candidates but are subject to contribution limits in their fundraising. Super PACs may not 
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representative of the country as a whole. They were heavily old, white, male, 
and, of course, wealthy.4 They also were far more polarized in their political 
views than the general population.5 Most Americans were moderates in 2012, but 
most donors were staunch liberals or conservatives.6 
However, there is no evidence that much of this money is traded explicitly 
for political favors. Proof of quid pro quo transactions is vanishingly rare,7 and 
studies that try to document a link between PACs’ contributions and politicians’ 
votes typically come up empty.8 But there is evidence that politicians’ positions 
reflect the preferences of their donors to an uncanny extent.9 The ideal points of 
members of Congress—that is, the “unique set[s] of policies that they ‘prefer’ to 
all others”—have almost exactly the same bimodal distribution as the ideal points 
of individual contributors.10 They look nothing like the far more centrist 
distribution of the public at large.11 
Suppose a jurisdiction is troubled by this situation and decides to enact some 
kind of campaign finance reform. What reason might it give? One option is 
preventing the corruption of elected officials. But the Supreme Court has recently 
narrowed the definition of corruption to quid pro quo exchanges,12 and, as just 
noted, such exchanges do not occur with any regularity in contemporary 
America.13 Another possibility is avoiding the distortion of electoral outcomes 
due to the heavy spending of affluent individuals (and groups). But the Court has 
contribute to candidates but may raise money in unlimited quantities. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (authorizing creation of Super PACs). 
4 See PETER L. FRANCIA ET AL., THE FINANCIERS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: INVESTORS, 
IDEOLOGUES, AND INTIMATES 16 (2003) (“[C]ontributors are indeed overwhelmingly wealthy, highly educated, 
male, and white. The pool of congressional contributors does not remotely look like America . . . .”); Adam 
Bonica et al., Why Hasn’t Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?, 27 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 103, 111 (2013) 
(noting that “the share of campaign contributions made by the top 0.01 percent of the voting age population is 
now over 40 percent”). 
5 See Joseph Bafumi & Michael C. Herron, Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American 
Voters and Their Members in Congress, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 519, 536 (2010) (showing bimodal distribution 
of donors compared to more normal distribution of non-donors); Michael Barber, Representing the Preferences 
of Voters, Partisans, and Donors in the U.S. Senate 19 (Mar. 25, 2014) (showing wide gulf between ideal points 
of donors and voters). 
6 See id. 
7 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 149 (2003) (noting that, when assembling record for Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Congress was unable to find “concrete evidence of an instance in which a 
federal officeholder has actually switched a vote” in response to a contribution). 
8 See, e.g., Ansolabehere et al., supra note 2, at 116 (concluding in meta-study of relevant literature that 
“changes in donations to an individual legislator do not translate into changes in that legislator’s roll call voting 
behavior”). But see Thomas Stratmann, Some Talk: Money in Politics: A (Partial) Review of the Literature, 124 
PUB. CHOICE 135, 146 (2005) (reaching opposite conclusion).  
9 See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 5, at 536-37 (showing that members of Congress and donors both have 
highly bimodal ideal point distributions); Barber, supra note 5, at 19 (showing that typical donor is much closer 
ideologically to her senator than is typical voter); Bonica, supra note 2, at 27 (also showing highly bimodal 
distributions for members of Congress and donors). 
10 Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences in Congress, 
State Legislatures, and Cities, 75 J. POL. 330, 331 (2013); see also, e.g., Bafumi & Herron, supra note 5, at 521 
(“Ideal points . . . are best thought of as reflecting preferred policy choices in a given policy space.”). 
11 See supra note 9. 
12 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014) (plurality opinion) (“Congress may target only a 
specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.”); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010). 
13 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
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emphatically rejected any governmental interest in ameliorating “‘the corrosive 
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth.’”14 Yet another idea is 
equalizing the resources of candidates or the electoral influence of voters. But 
this equality interest has been deemed invalid in even more strident terms. “[T]he 
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society 
in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment.”15 
So is our reformist jurisdiction out of luck? Not quite. This Article’s thesis is 
that there is an additional interest, of the gravest importance, that both is 
threatened by money in politics and is furthered by (certain) campaign finance 
regulation.16 This interest is the promotion of alignment between voters’ policy 
preferences and their government’s policy outputs. Alignment operates at the 
levels of both the individual constituency and the jurisdiction as a whole. Within 
the constituency, the views of the district’s median voter and the district’s 
representative should align. One step up, the preferences of the jurisdiction’s 
median voter and the legislature’s median member should correspond. Moreover, 
at the jurisdictional level, the median voter’s views should be congruent not only 
with the median legislator’s positions, but also with actual policy outcomes. 
Preference alignment refers to the former sort of congruence; outcome alignment 
to the latter. 
Alignment is a significant—indeed, compelling—interest because of its tight 
connection to core democratic values. At the district level, it follows directly 
from the delegate theory of representation. A delegate “must do what his 
principal would do, must act as if the principal himself were acting . . . must vote 
as a majority of his constituents would,” as Hanna Pitkin wrote in her landmark 
work.17 In other words, a delegate must align his own positions with those of his 
constituents. Likewise, at the jurisdictional level, alignment is essentially another 
term for majoritarianism. To say that policy should be congruent with the 
preferences of the median voter is to say that it should be congruent with the 
preferences of the majority. Of course, majoritarianism is not our only 
democratic principle. But, as Jeremy Waldron has argued, it is “required as a 
matter of fairness to all those who participate in the social choice.”18 
Unsurprisingly, given its democratic roots, the concept of alignment has 
surfaced repeatedly in the Court’s campaign finance decisions. In a 2000 case, 
the Court recognized “the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the 
wishes of large contributors”—and not compliant enough with the wishes of 
14 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 
(1990)). 
15 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976). 
16 In earlier work, I have applied the alignment approach to election law as a whole. See Nicholas O. 
Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283 (2014); see also infra Section I.A 
(explaining motivation for campaign finance focus of this Article). 
17 HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 144-45 (1967). 
18 Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?, 123 YALE L.J. 1692, 1718 
(2014) (referring to decision-making procedures in legislatures and courts). 
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voters.19 In a 2003 case, the Court warned of “the danger that officeholders will 
decide issues not [based on] the desires of their constituencies, but according to 
the wishes of those who have made large financial contributions.”20 And in its 
most recent campaign finance decision, McCutcheon v. FEC,21 a decision 
otherwise unremittingly hostile to regulation, the Court strikingly concluded its 
opinion with a paean to alignment. “Representatives are not to follow constituent 
orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive to those concerns. 
Such responsiveness is key to the very concept of self-governance through 
elected officials.”22 
Despite these doctrinal hints, some scholars claim that alignment is a 
forbidden interest in the campaign finance context. Kathleen Sullivan reasons 
that alignment reflects a particular theory of democracy, and that speech cannot 
be restricted based on “one vision of good government.”23 Similarly, Robert Post 
contends that in the First Amendment domain of public discourse, public opinion 
is forever changing shape. Thus “[t]here is no ‘baseline’ from which 
[misalignment] can be assessed.”24 These critiques are misplaced. As to Sullivan, 
it might be controversial for the Court to embrace a specific model of democracy, 
but surely a popularly elected legislature may do so. In fact, legislatures adopt 
theories of self-governance all the time, both when they regulate money in 
politics and when they enact other electoral policies. As to Post, public opinion 
actually is not as fluid as he suggests, and alignment furthers what he deems the 
crucial aim of public discourse: making “persons believe that government is 
potentially responsive to their views.”25 It is unclear as well why electoral speech 
should be considered part of public discourse rather than the managerial domain 
of elections, in which speech may be regulated to serve the domain’s ends. 
Even if alignment is not a forbidden interest, it may be a duplicative one. As 
Richard Hasen has argued, it may be nothing more than a slick repackaging of 
the anti-distortion or equality interests that the Court already has rejected.26 This 
charge also misses its mark. The distortion that cannot justify campaign finance 
regulation, in the Court’s view, is the skewing of electoral outcomes due to large 
expenditures.27 The Court has never suggested that the warping of policy 
outcomes due to large contributions (or their equivalent) is an illegitimate basis 
for regulation. The distortion of voters is different from that of representatives. 
Alignment also is distinct from equality (in all its guises). One form of 
equality is the leveling of candidate resources. But candidates need not be 
equally funded to produce alignment, nor does alignment follow from evenly 
19 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). 
20 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003). 
21 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
22 Id. at 1462 (plurality opinion). 
23 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 680 (1997). 
24 ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 53 (2014). 
25 Id. at 49. 
26 See Richard L. Hasen, Is “Dependence Corruption” Distinct from a Political Equality Argument for 
Campaign Finance Laws? A Reply to Professor Lessig, 12 ELECTION L.J. 305, 308 (2013). 
27 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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sized war chests. Another kind of equality is equal representation for all voters. 
But it is only the median voter, not every voter, who is entitled to congruence 
under the alignment approach. Alignment at the median can arise only if there is 
misalignment at all other points in the distribution. A final type of equality is 
equal voter influence over the political process. But equal influence is, at most, a 
means to achieving alignment. It is not the end itself. Alignment also is possible 
under conditions of unequal influence, and equal influence does not necessarily 
result in alignment. 
Assume, then, that alignment is a compelling interest that neither is barred by 
First Amendment theory nor is identical to goals the Court already has rebuffed. 
We are not done yet. The next step is to determine whether money in politics can 
generate misalignment, and whether campaign finance reform can promote 
alignment. According to a burgeoning political science literature, the answer to 
both questions is yes, at least sometimes. The relevant empirical evidence fits 
into three categories. 
First, according to numerous studies, wealthy Americans have more 
influence on politicians’ voting records and actual policy outcomes than do poor 
or middle-class Americans.28 This extra sway is evident whether House or Senate 
voting records, or state or federal policy outcomes, are considered. It also appears 
even after non-monetary forms of political participation (voting, volunteering, 
contacting officials, etc.) are controlled for. Second, as noted at the outset, 
politicians and donors have nearly identical ideal point distributions: highly 
bimodal curves in which they cluster at the ideological extremes and almost no 
one occupies the moderate center.29 Voters’ views, in contrast, exhibit a normal 
distribution whose single peak is in the middle of the political spectrum. It is fair 
to say that donors receive exquisitely attentive representation—and that voters 
receive virtually no representation at all.  
Third, campaign finance regulation can be aligning or misaligning based on 
its implications for how candidates raise their money.30 Tight individual 
contribution limits reduce the funds available from polarized individual donors. 
They therefore encourage candidates to shift toward the ideological center, the 
home of the median voter. Conversely, stringent party or PAC contribution limits 
have the opposite effect. Both parties and PACs are relatively moderate in their 
giving patterns—parties because their chief goal is winning as many seats as 
possible, PACs because they want access to incumbents of all political stripes. 
Reducing the funds available from these more centrist sources thus incentivizes 
candidates to move toward the ideological fringes. As for public financing, its 
impact hinges on its treatment of individual donors. “Clean money” schemes that 
provide block grants to candidates after they receive enough individual 
contributions are misaligning because of the extremism of the donors who 
initially must be wooed. But multiple-match systems that offer high matching 
28 See infra Section III.A. 
29 See infra Section III.B. 
30 See infra Section III.C. 
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ratios for small contributions may be aligning because of the more representative 
pool of donors they attract. 
What do these findings mean for the constitutionality of different policies? 
Individual contribution limits would sit on sturdy legal ground under the 
alignment approach. Whatever their link may be to the prevention of corruption, 
they demonstrably further the governmental interest in alignment. Unlike under 
current law, individual expenditure limits also might survive judicial scrutiny. 
Since politicians mirror the views of not only individuals who donate directly to 
them, but also individuals who spend on their behalf, no great significance would 
attach to the contribution/expenditure distinction. Public financing that relies on 
individual donors who resemble the general population (or that does not rely on 
individual donors at all) would be valid as well. On the other hand, contribution 
and expenditure limits for parties and PACs could not be sustained by reference 
to alignment. Since these entities are relatively moderate, their funds exert little 
misaligning pressure. Public financing that requires appeals to polarized 
individual donors also could be justified only on the basis of other interests. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the alignment interest. It 
describes the different forms of alignment, explains the role the concept has 
played in earlier campaign finance cases, and responds to the claim that general 
First Amendment principles proscribe the interest. Part II argues for the 
distinctiveness of alignment. It compares alignment to the interests the Court 
already has considered—anti-corruption, anti-distortion, and equality—and 
shows that it is different from each of them. Part III conveys the current state of 
knowledge about alignment. It summarizes the many studies on the misaligning 
influence of money in politics, as well as the fewer studies on the aligning impact 
of (some) regulation. Lastly, Part IV assesses the implications of this literature 
for the validity of different policies. Individual contribution and expenditure 
limits, and certain kinds of public financing, should be upheld because they 
promote alignment. But contribution and expenditure limits for parties and PACs, 
and other kinds of public financing, cannot be justified on this basis. 
One final question should be answered before proceeding further. Given the 
array of interests already asserted in the campaign finance context, is there really 
a need for another one? In fact, the need is dire, for two reasons. First, the only 
interest the Court currently considers to be legitimate—the narrowly construed 
anti-corruption interest—neither captures the full extent of the harm caused by 
money in politics, nor is sufficient to sustain most campaign finance regulation. 
In recent years, policies have toppled like dominos, rejected by the Court due to a 
lack of fit with this interest. If the reform project is to avoid collapsing entirely, 
we must, in Michael Kang’s words, “look[] beyond the prevention of corruption 
as defined by the Court.”31 
31 Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 47 (2012); see also Richard 
Briffault, On Dejudicializing American Campaign Finance Law, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 887, 890 (2011) (“The 
central constitutional question in campaign finance law is what public interests justify restrictions . . . affecting 
the use of campaign money.”); Guy-Uriel Charles, Corruption Temptation, 102 CAL. L. REV. 25, 26 (2014) 
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Second, the misalignment produced by electoral fundraising and spending is 
not holding steady. Instead, it is getting worse. Over the last generation, the share 
of campaign funds provided by the wealthiest 0.01% of Americans has surged 
from about 10% to more than 40%.32 During the same period, individual donors 
steadily have become more extreme in their political views,33 and candidates 
steadily have become more dependent on their contributions.34 As a result, the 
representational gap in favor of the affluent is now five times larger than it was in 
the 1970s and 1980s.35 Misalignment thus is not a problem that can safely be 
ignored. Rather, it is a problem that—increasingly—threatens to swallow 
American democracy. 
 
I. THE ALIGNMENT INTEREST 
 
The term alignment is unhelpful until it is clear what should be aligned and 
where. I begin this Part, then, by identifying two axes that can be used to 
categorize different forms of alignment. The first refers to the governmental 
output that should be aligned with voters’ preferences; the second to the 
governmental level where the alignment should occur. After defining the 
alignment interest, I address a series of related issues: its democratic appeal, its 
administrability, its novelty, and its legal and practical limitations. 
Upon conclusion of this brisk survey, I turn to the place of alignment in the 
campaign finance doctrine. The Supreme Court often has used language evoking 
alignment to denote a legitimate basis for regulation, including in its most recent 
decision on the subject. But, ironically, the substance of the Court’s holdings 
often has contributed to the misalignment that plagues modern American politics. 
And again the Court’s most recent case is no exception.  
Lastly, I respond to the critique, made in the 1990s by Sullivan and in the 
2013 Tanner Lectures by Post, that alignment (or something like it) is a forbidden 
interest in the campaign finance context. Sullivan wrongly claims that it is 
impermissible for a jurisdiction to embrace a particular theory of democracy, and 
wrongly supposes that such a choice can be avoided. And Post should be more 
receptive to actual alignment given his endorsement of perceived alignment as a 
(“We no longer talk about the gamut of values that we would like to see reflected in a system of campaign 
financing.”). 
32 See Bonica et al., supra note 4, at 112.  
33 See Raymond J. La Raja & David L. Wiltse, Don’t Blame Donors for Ideological Polarization of 
Political Parties: Ideological Change and Stability Among Political Contributors, 1972-2008, 40 AM. POL. 
RESEARCH 501, 510 (2011) (showing rise in proportion of donors who are “ideologues” from 40% in 1972 to 
60% in 2008). 
34 See Michael Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of State Legislatures 
23 (Sept. 4, 2013) (showing rise in share of state legislative candidate funds received from individual donors 
from 25% in 1990 to 50% in 2012); Michael Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of 
Polarization 31 (showing analogous rise for congressional candidates from 50% to 75%). 
35 See Christopher Ellis, Representational Inequity Across Time and Space: Exploring Changes in the 
Political Representation of the Poor in the U.S. House 9 (showing gap between alignment of House members 
with rich and with poor constituents over time). 
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basis for regulation. The gap between reality and perception is insufficient to bar 
one interest but to compel the other. 
 
A. Reprise 
 
I mentioned above that my survey of the alignment interest would be brisk. 
This is because I have elaborated on the interest elsewhere, in work arguing for 
the adoption of alignment as an overarching principle of election law.36 There is 
no reason to repeat all of that analysis here. But there is reason to say more about 
alignment in the campaign finance context specifically. As noted earlier, the anti-
corruption interest urgently needs to be bolstered, and the misalignment caused 
by money in politics is steadily worsening.37 The bulk of the Article thus 
examines the intersection of alignment and campaign finance. Only this Section 
deals with alignment more generally. 
Starting with taxonomy, there are three kinds of governmental outputs that 
should be congruent with voters’ preferences.38 The first is a representative’s 
partisan affiliation. If a representative belongs to the party preferred by the 
median voter,39 then there is partisan alignment. The second is a representative’s 
policy views. If a representative has the same ideal point as the median voter, 
then there is preference alignment. And the third is actual policy outcomes. If 
enacted policy corresponds to the wishes of the median voter, then there is 
outcome alignment. Of these three variants, I address only the latter two in this 
Article (and depict only them in Figure 1). Asymmetric campaign spending can 
cause partisan misalignment, by shifting electoral outcomes from what they 
would have been under conditions of more equal outlays.40 But this is the one 
form of misalignment that the Court’s precedent unambiguously rules out as an 
acceptable basis for regulation.41 
36 See generally Stephanopoulos, supra note 16. 
37 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. This also is the only domain where the very validity of 
the alignment interest is disputed. 
38 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 16, at 304-10. Careful readers may note that my terminology is slightly 
different here than in my earlier work. What I previously called “policy alignment” I now refer to as 
“preference alignment.” I also discuss outcome alignment in this Article while I omitted it before. See id. at 
311-12. 
39 The median voter is the voter at the midpoint of the relevant distribution. Only this voter necessarily 
represents the views of a majority of the electorate, and so cannot be outvoted by any other group. For this 
majoritarian reason, the median voter serves here as the normative benchmark relative to which alignment is 
determined. I prefer the median actual voter to other potential benchmarks such as the median eligible voter or 
the median citizen, since in a democracy it is actual voters who select the representatives who then enact policy. 
40 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 16, at 338-39. In this case, misalignment ensues between the median 
actual voter and the median hypothetical voter exposed to more equal outlays. See id. 
41 In case after case, the Court has rejected interests that are based on a benchmark of equal campaign 
spending. See, e.g., Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825 (2011) 
(“We have repeatedly rejected the argument that the government has a compelling state interest in ‘leveling the 
playing field’ that can justify undue burdens on political speech.”); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 348 
(2010) (rejecting interest in preventing distortion of electoral outcomes due to heavy corporate spending); Davis 
v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 741-42 (2008); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54 (1976) (rejecting “interest in equalizing 
the relative financial resources of candidates competing for elective office”). I do not agree with these cases’ 
reasoning, but I bracket this disagreement for present purposes. 
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Next, there are two governmental levels at which alignment should occur.42 
The first is the individual constituency, in which the preferences of the district’s 
median voter and the district’s representative should be congruent. Since districts 
have (almost) no policymaking authority, only partisan alignment and preference 
alignment are sensible concepts at this level. The second is the jurisdiction as a 
whole, in which governmental outputs should match the preferences of the 
jurisdiction’s median voter. With respect to partisan alignment and preference 
alignment, the relevant outputs are, in turn, the partisan affiliation and the ideal 
point of the median legislator. With respect to outcome alignment, the relevant 
output is enacted policy. As discussed below, both dyadic and collective 
alignment should be deemed valid rationales for regulation.43 
 
FIGURE 1: ILLUSTRATIONS OF PREFERENCE AND OUTCOME MISALIGNMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why, then, is alignment an attractive value? The most important answer is 
that it is implied by several widely accepted theories of democracy. At the dyadic 
level, one of the classic conceptions of the representative’s role is the delegate 
model. As the earlier quote from Hanna Pitkin illustrates, a delegate is supposed 
to act in accordance with the wishes of his constituents—to “do what his 
principal would do.”44 In the words of two other theorists, “The delegate theory 
of representation . . . posits that the representative ought to reflect purposively the 
42 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 16, at 310-11. Again, my terminology for these levels is slightly 
different here than in previous work. What I previously called “district-specific alignment” I now refer to as 
“dyadic alignment,” and what I previously labeled “legislative alignment” I now dub “collective alignment.” 
43 See infra Sections I.B-C, Part II. 
44 PITKIN, supra note 17, at 144-45. 
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preferences of his constituents.”45 Both of these formulations necessarily entail 
alignment. If a delegate does what his constituents want, he must be aligning his 
positions with theirs.  
Likewise, at the collective level, one of the pillars of American democratic 
thought is majoritarianism. Madison stated in The Federalist Papers that the 
“fundamental principle of free government” is that the “majority . . . would 
rule.”46 Hamilton declared it a “poison” to “subject the sense of the greater 
number to that of the lesser.”47 In more recent times too, Alexander Bickel has 
remarked that we are “a nation committed to . . . majoritarian democracy,”48 and 
Jesse Choper has written that throughout “this nation’s constitutional 
development from its origin to the present time, majority rule has been 
considered the keystone of a democratic political system.”49 Once again, 
alignment follows from these arguments. If the wishes of the collective majority 
(embodied in the median voter) are heeded by officeholders, then governmental 
outputs must be congruent with those wishes.50 
To be sure, there are other theories of democracy with which alignment is in 
tension.51 The trustee model of representation holds that elected officials should 
exercise their own independent judgment, not abide by the preferences of their 
constituents.52 Pluralists argue that “minorities rule” as they join together in ever 
shifting combinations.53 Minimalist democrats downplay congruence in favor of 
retrospective accountability based on politicians’ records in office.54 And so 
forth. But the point here is not that alignment is required by democratic theory. It 
is only that alignment is consistent with key conceptions of democracy—and thus 
that jurisdictions should have the discretion to invoke it if they so desire. 
Alignment may not be an obligatory state interest, but surely its democratic 
origin makes it a permissible one.55 
45 Donald J. McCrone & James H. Kuklinski, The Delegate Theory of Representation, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
278, 278 (1979). 
46 THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison). 
47 THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton). My aim here is not to make an originalist case for 
alignment, but rather to observe that positions consistent with it are well within the mainstream of the American 
democratic tradition. See also Bruce E. Cain, Democracy More or Less: The Quandary of American Political 
Reform 214 (2014) (observing that populism is one of three major schools of American democratic thought, and 
that populism understands “democratic distortion” to be “a chronic deviation from median voter preference”). 
48 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 188 (1962).  
49 JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 4 (1980). 
50 Of course, majoritarianism is inapplicable to “areas that the Constitution has declared off-limits to 
ordinary politics,” such as the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Stephanopoulos, supra note 16, at 321. It also is 
important to distinguish between majoritarianism in the election of representatives and majoritarianism in the 
adoption of positions and policies by representatives. Only the latter form of majoritarianism is equivalent to 
alignment. 
51 Though as I have explained in my previous work, this tension is more illusory than real, in particular for 
pluralism and minimalism. See id. at 313-16.  
52 See PITKIN, supra note 17, at 127. 
53 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 132 (1956). 
54 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 272 (2d ed. 1947). 
55 A fascinating issue, which I note here but do not explore further, is what makes a given interest 
“compelling” for purposes of constitutional law. Is it enough that an interest corresponds to a theory of 
democracy? But, if so, why is equality not a compelling interest? And how does an interest rooted in a 
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The other advantage of alignment is that it is more determinate than concepts 
such as corruption, distortion, and equality. As I explain in Part II, the Court has 
struggled for nearly forty years to construe these terms, lurching unpredictably 
from one definition to another.56 In contrast, alignment quite plainly refers to the 
correspondence of a given popular input with a given governmental output. Per 
the above taxonomy, it is true that there are different inputs and outputs that can 
be aligned at different levels. But this only means that there are several kinds of 
alignment. It does not undermine the clarity of the idea itself. If “[a]n ounce of 
administrability is worth a pound of theoretical perfection,” as David Strauss has 
quipped about justifications for campaign finance reform, then alignment may tip 
the scale.57 
A skeptic might retort that alignment is theoretically determinate but 
practically hopeless. How, after all, are voters’ policy preferences and their 
government’s policy outputs even supposed to be measured, let alone compared 
to each other? Not long ago, this objection might have been fatal. But in the last 
few years, political scientists have made great strides in quantifying both public 
opinion and the activities of elected officials.58 The most promising new work 
takes advantage of questions answered by both voters and representatives to plot 
their positions in a common policy space.59 To the extent they pertain to money 
in politics, these studies are discussed in Part III.60 In sum, this scholarship leaves 
little doubt that, as a group of political scientists has written, “methodological 
advances [now] allow us to evaluate the congruence between voters and 
legislators across districts and time.”61 
But while the indeterminacy charge falls flat, there are other critiques (or, 
rather, caveats) that ought to be acknowledged. First, the alignment interest does 
not always support the lawfulness of campaign finance regulation. Policies that 
exert an aligning influence may be defended on this basis. But policies whose 
effects are ambiguous or misaligning—of which there are many—must be 
tethered to other interests or else face invalidation. Alignment does not give a 
free pass to challenged laws. Second, while no other scholar has argued explicitly 
for alignment as a compelling interest, the idea that money in politics may disrupt 
democratic theory rate relative to interests based on other values, such as national security or the righting of 
historical wrongs? These are important and difficult questions, and I hope to address them in future work. 
56 See infra Part II. 
57 David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1386 
(1994). 
58 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 16, at 308 n.102 (discussing these advances). 
59 See id. at 309 n.103 (examining these studies in particular). 
60 See infra Part III. 
61 Thad Kousser et al., Reform and Representation: Assessing California’s Top-Two Primary and 
Redistricting Commission 2 (Aug. 27, 2013); see also, e.g., Bafumi & Herron, supra note 5, at 524 (noting 
ability to “bridg[e] institutions and voters in a way that allows common space ideal point estimates to be 
generated”); Boris Shor, All Together Now: Putting Congress, State Legislatures, and Individuals in a Common 
Ideological Space to Assess Representation at the Macro and Micro Levels 3 (Apr. 25, 2011) (succeeding in 
“measuring ideological distributions of state congressional delegations, legislatures, and citizens all on the same 
scale”). Moreover, both voters’ and officeholders’ ideologies typically can be captured by a single left-right 
dimension corresponding to governmental intervention in the economy (at least in recent years). See 
Stephanopoulos, supra note 16, at 309 & nn. 104-05. 
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the link between public opinion and public policy is not new. It has appeared in 
the work of, among others, Richard Briffault, Bruce Cain, Samuel Issacharoff, 
and Lawrence Lessig.62 What is new here is the framing of the issue as well as 
the systematic treatment of the theory, doctrine, and empirics of alignment. 
Third, alignment is not, of course, the only available interest in the campaign 
finance context. The prevention of (a constricted notion of) corruption remains a 
valid basis for regulation, and the Court also recognizes an informational interest 
in providing voters with data about campaign contributions and expenditures.63 
Moreover, the anti-distortion and equality rationales may have been “orphaned,” 
in Hasen’s phrase, but their resonance cannot be denied in a democracy that 
adheres to the principle of one person, one vote.64 Fourth, it is important to be 
clear that money in politics is only one of many causes of misalignment in 
today’s America. Even if the misaligning effects of campaign funds were 
eliminated entirely, significant noncongruence would persist thanks to franchise 
restrictions, partisan pressures, legislative rules, gerrymandered districts, etc. 
Misalignment is a complex phenomenon with no simple solution.65 
Finally, perfect alignment is an inherently unattainable goal. Even a 
jurisdiction (or representative) that cares about nothing else might lack 
information about voters’ preferences on certain subjects, or be unable to change 
policies (or policy stances) at exactly the same rate at which public opinion 
shifts. Voters’ preferences on particular matters also might be weak, uninformed, 
or unstable—and so less worthy of respect from a democratic perspective (and 
more difficult to heed from a practical one). Overall ideological alignment, then, 
is more important than alignment on each individual issue that appears on the 
political agenda. Likewise, persistent misalignment is more objectionable than 
misalignment that is temporary and soon resolves.66 
 
B. Doctrinal Role 
 
The above was admittedly a bit of a breakneck tour of the alignment interest. 
But it sufficed, I hope, to lay the groundwork for the ensuing application of the 
interest to campaign finance law.67 I begin this application by considering the 
role that alignment has played in the Court’s cases on money in politics. It by no 
62 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO 
STOP IT 151 (2011) (proposing concept of “substantive distortion,” the “gap between what ‘the People’ believe 
about an issue and what Congress does about that issue”); Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the 
Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 1751, 1772 (1999) (identifying “danger that officeholders will be too 
attentive to the interests of donors . . . and insufficiently concerned about the public interest”); Bruce E. Cain, 
Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. CHI. L. FORUM 111, 138; Samuel Issacharoff, On 
Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 126 (2010). 
63 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366-67 (2010). 
64 See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 989, 990 (2011). There also are several important election law values other than alignment, such as 
competition, participation, and minority representation. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 16, at 356-60. 
65 See id. at 324-36, 342-55 (discussing misaligning effects of other election laws); id. at 360-65 
(discussing misaligning effects of non-legal factors). 
66 See id. at 309-10 (also making this point). 
67 Readers who would like a more extensive treatment should consult my earlier work. See id. 
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means has been their centerpiece, but it has appeared in them repeatedly—less 
surprisingly in the more pro-regulatory period of the early 2000s, but more 
unexpectedly in the Court’s most recent blockbuster, McCutcheon v. FEC.68 
However, despite the lip service they sometimes have paid to alignment, the 
Court’s decisions also have helped produce the startling misalignment that 
defines American politics today. By nullifying all expenditure limits and, just this 
year, permitting much larger aggregate contributions, the Court often has 
strengthened misaligning forces at the expense of aligning ones. 
Most analyses of campaign finance doctrine begin with the 1976 decision of 
Buckley v. Valeo,69 but the Court’s first references to alignment date back (at 
least) to 1957. In United States v. Automobile Workers,70 involving the 
prosecution of a labor union for funding a campaign commercial, the Court 
defended the federal ban on corporate and union electoral activity as follows. 
“‘The idea is to prevent . . . the great aggregations of wealth from using their 
corporate funds . . . to send members of the legislature to these halls in order to 
vote for their protection and the advancement of their interests as against those of 
the public.’”71 The Court added that “‘when an individual or association of 
individuals makes large contributions . . . they . . . occasionally, at least, receive 
consideration by the beneficiaries of their contributions which not infrequently is 
harmful to the general public interest.’”72 
Both of these passages articulate an interest akin to alignment. In the first 
excerpt, the stated purpose of the federal ban is preventing elected officials from 
pursuing the “‘protection and the advancement of [corporate] interests’” and so 
neglecting “‘those of the public.’”73 This is another way of saying that the ban 
aims to avoid misalignment in the direction of corporate concerns. Similarly, the 
second quote asserts that large contributions sometimes can induce 
“‘consideration by the beneficiaries’” that is “‘harmful to the general public 
interest.’”74 In other words, large contributions sometimes can induce 
misalignment in the direction of contributors. 
In the post-Buckley era, the first hint of the alignment interest came in the 
1985 case of FEC v. NCPAC.75 The majority struck down a limit on PAC 
spending in presidential races.76 But in dissent, Justice White voiced his concern 
about the potential “infusion of massive PAC expenditures into the political 
68 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) 
69 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
70 352 U.S. 567 (1957). 
71 Id. at 571 (quoting Elihu Root). 
72 Id. at 576 (quoting 65 CONG. REC. 9507-08 (1923)); see also id. (“‘[O]ne of the great political evils of 
the time is the apparent hold on political parties which business interests . . . seek and sometimes obtain by 
reason of liberal campaign contributions.’”). 
73 Id. at 571 (quoting Elihu Root). 
74 Id. at 576 (quoting 65 CONG. REC. 9507-08 (1923)). To be fair, the “public interest” is not necessarily 
identical to the views held by the median voter. These excerpts thus convey a slightly different conception of 
misalignment. 
75 470 U.S. 480 (1985). 
76 See id. at 501. 
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process.”77 His fear was that, thanks to these expenditures, “[t]he candidate may 
be forced to please the spenders rather than the voters, and the two groups are not 
identical.”78 That is, the candidate may be forced to align her positions with the 
spenders who support her campaign rather than the voters who actually elect her. 
Justice White’s argument in dissent became the holding of the Court in two 
important cases in the early 2000s. First, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government 
PAC, the Court described the problem that contribution limits are meant to solve 
as the “broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large 
contributors.”79 Politicians too compliant with the wishes of contributors, of 
course, are not compliant enough with those of voters. The Court also noted that 
outsized checks can foster the “cynical assumption that large donors call the 
tune.”80 This is a claim about the appearance rather than the reality of 
misalignment, but it sounds in a similar register. 
Second, in McConnell v. FEC,81 the Court used language even more 
evocative of alignment to uphold the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s 
(BCRA) soft money ban.82 The Court observed that soft money donors received 
special access to officeholders, which led in turn to undue influence over their 
decisions. “Implicit . . . in the sale of access is the suggestion that money buys 
influence.”83 The Court also catalogued a number of cases in which soft money 
donors managed to thwart the passage of popular bills. “The evidence connects 
soft money to manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress’ 
failure to enact, among other things, generic drug legislation, tort reform, and 
tobacco legislation.”84 And in its clearest ever statement of the alignment interest, 
the Court declared, “Just as troubling to a functioning democracy . . . is the 
danger that officeholders will decide issues not on . . . the desires of their 
constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have made large 
financial contributions valued by the officeholder.”85 This “danger” is the 
essence of misalignment. 
In the decade after McConnell, no Court majority referred to alignment, but 
the concept continued to surface in individual Justices’ opinions. In the 2007 case 
of FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., Justice Scalia lamented that “the effect of 
BCRA has been to concentrate more political power in the hands of the country’s 
wealthiest individuals.”86 He noted that in 2004, “a mere 24 individuals 
77 Id. at 517. 
78 Id. 
79 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). 
80 Id. at 390; see also id. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that contribution limits “seek to protect 
the integrity of the electoral process—the means through which a free society democratically translates political 
speech into concrete governmental action”); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 
441 (2001) (citing language from Shrink Missouri on “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment”). 
81 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
82 “Soft money” refers to previously unregulated funds that were donated to political parties to pay for 
activities other than express advocacy for or against candidates. See id. at 122-26. 
83 Id. at 154; see also id. (“[P]urchasers of such access unabashedly admit that they are seeking to 
purchase just such influence.”). 
84 Id. at 150. 
85 Id. at 153. 
86 551 U.S. 449, 503 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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contributed an astounding total of $142 million to [unregulated groups].”87 In the 
2010 case of Citizens United v. FEC, Justice Stevens argued that when “private 
interests . . . exert outsized control over officeholders solely on account of the 
money spent on (or withheld from) their campaigns, the result can . . . [be] a 
‘subversion . . . of the electoral process.’”88 And in the 2011 case of Arizona Free 
Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, Justice Kagan remarked that 
the “ultimate object” of the First Amendment is “a government responsive to the 
will of the people.”89 She added that “[i]f an officeholder owes his election to 
wealthy contributors, he may act for their benefit alone, rather than on behalf of 
all the people.”90 
Lest these comments be dismissed as the sour grapes of dissenting Justices, 
the full Court, in its most recent campaign finance case, McCutcheon v. FEC,91 
concluded its opinion with what can be read as a tribute to alignment. “For the 
past 40 years, our campaign finance jurisprudence has focused on the need to . . . 
[avoid] compromising the political responsiveness at the heart of the democratic 
process,” began the Court’s coda.92 Turning to political theory, the Court 
continued, “As Edmund Burke explained . . . a representative owes constituents . 
. . judgment informed by ‘the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the 
most unreserved communication with his constituents.’”93 And summing up its 
views, the Court announced, “Representatives are not to follow constituent 
orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive to those concerns. 
Such responsiveness is key to the very concept of self-governance through 
elected officials.”94 
Given the context, it is unclear what kind of responsiveness the Court had in 
mind when it penned this passage. In McCutcheon, the Court voided aggregate 
contribution limits that imposed a ceiling on the total amount of money that 
donors could give in federal elections.95 The Court thus may have been lauding 
politicians’ responsiveness to contributors here, not their responsiveness to 
voters.96 But even if this is what the Court meant, it certainly is not what it said. 
87 Id. at 503-04; see also id. at 522 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing the “pervasive distortion of electoral 
institutions by concentrated wealth” through “the special access and guaranteed favor that sap the representative 
integrity of American government”). 
88 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting United States v. 
Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957)). 
89 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2846 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
90 Id. at 2830. 
91 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
92 Id. at 1461 (plurality opinion). 
93 Id. (quoting Edmund Burke). 
94 Id. at 1462; see also id. at 1441 (arguing that “a central feature of democracy” is that “constituents 
support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are elected can be expected to be 
responsive to those concerns”). Justice Breyer’s dissent also contained several passages noting the importance 
of alignment. See, e.g., id. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing “‘the end that government may be 
responsive to the will of the people’” (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931))); id. at 1468 
(explaining “the constitutional effort to create a democracy responsive to the people—a government where laws 
reflect the very thoughts, views, ideas, and sentiments”). 
95 See id. at 1442-43 (describing operation of aggregate limits). 
96 Some support for this view comes from Justice Kennedy’s opinion in McConnell. He also declared that 
“[d]emocracy is premised on responsiveness,” and elaborated that “a substantial and legitimate reason . . . to 
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Indeed, the Court referred three times to “constituents” as the group to which 
elected officials should be responsive.97 Accordingly, McCutcheon remains the 
Court’s most recent, most extensive—and most unexpected—account of the 
importance of alignment. 
To be sure, neither McCutcheon nor any other case actually has held that 
alignment is a distinct governmental interest that can justify the regulation of 
campaign funds. The paean in McCutcheon was pure dictum in a decision 
otherwise hostile to regulation. Likewise, the excerpts from Shrink Missouri and 
McConnell were efforts to broaden the Court’s definition of corruption, not to 
devise a new rationale for regulation.98 The Court also has shied away from these 
excerpts in subsequent cases.99 The point, then, is not that the Court has been 
employing something like the alignment approach all along. It plainly has not 
been. Rather, the point is that the Court sometimes has appreciated the value of 
alignment, and sometimes has recognized that money in politics can exert a 
misaligning influence. Were a future Court to designate alignment as a discrete 
state interest, it thus would be building on—not disrupting—its own precedent. 
(And this is very much a project for a future Court; the odds of the current 
majority embracing a new state interest in this area are next to nil.) 
A second caveat about the Court’s case law is that however positively it 
might have portrayed alignment, its actual impact often has been highly 
misaligning. As discussed in Part III, the key mechanism through which money 
in politics causes misalignment is the donating and spending of highly 
unrepresentative individuals.100 Either candidates shift their positions in these 
individuals’ direction in order to attract more funding, or only candidates who 
share the individuals’ positions in the first place become financially viable. Either 
way, noncongruence ensues in favor of this class of donors and spenders—and 
against ordinary voters. 
The Court’s decisions have bolstered this dynamic by removing many of the 
constraints that jurisdictions have tried to place on individual contributions and 
expenditures. In Buckley itself, the Court struck down limits imposed by 
Congress on individual expenditures.101 In Citizens United, the Court vetoed 
limits on corporate expenditures as well.102 Its conclusion that independent 
expenditures are inherently non-corrupting103 also enabled the creation of Super 
PACs: entities that can accept unlimited contributions (mostly from wealthy 
individuals) because they devote all of their resources to expenditures rather than 
make a contribution to[] one candidate over another is that the candidate will respond by producing those 
political outcomes the supporter favors.” McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
97 See McCutcheon, 131 S. Ct. at 1461-62. 
98 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 153; Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). 
99 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441; Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010). 
100 See infra Part III. 
101 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-51 (1976). 
102 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 336-66. 
103 See id. at 360 (“[I]ndependent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo 
corruption.”). 
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candidate donations.104 And in McCutcheon, the Court dismantled the aggregate 
contribution limits that had prevented rich donors from writing checks to dozens 
or hundreds of a party’s candidates.105 Now a single donor may give as much as 
$3.6 million in a single cycle.106 
In combination, these decisions have increased sharply the resources that 
affluent individuals can bring to bear on the electoral process. Had all three cases 
come out the other way, for instance, individuals would be able to donate no 
more than $5,200 per federal candidate,107 no more than $123,200 in 
aggregate,108 and not at all to Super PACs (which would not exist).109 Individuals 
also would be able to spend no more than $2,000 advocating for the election or 
defeat of a given candidate.110 In contrast, under current law, a single billionaire, 
Sheldon Adelson, managed to deploy $150 million in the 2012 cycle, mostly in 
contributions to Super PACs and other even less regulated groups.111 Another 
150 or so individuals provided at least $1 million each.112 It is the Court, then, 
that deserves a good deal of the blame for the misalignment that pervades 
American politics. The Court’s rulings have freed wealthy individuals from most 
of their regulatory restraints, thus intensifying their misaligning effect on the 
political system. Regrettably, this actual effect far outweighs the Court’s 
occasional warm words about the merits of alignment. 
 
C. A Forbidden Interest? 
 
And as for these warm words, two prominent scholars warn that they should 
not be taken too seriously. In fact, according to both Sullivan and Post, alignment 
(or something closely related to it) is a forbidden interest in the campaign finance 
context, barred by general First Amendment principles. Sullivan’s critique is 
based on her observation that a jurisdiction that asserts the alignment interest 
thereby commits itself to a particular conception of democracy. Post’s challenge 
follows from his view that public opinion is inherently fluid, and thus incapable 
of being aligned or misaligned with any governmental output. I respond to both 
of their claims below. 
Beginning with Sullivan, she acknowledges that concern about misalignment 
is a common rationale for campaign finance regulation. “Officeholders who are 
disproportionately beholden to a minority of powerful contributors, advocates of 
104 See supra note 3; see also Kang, supra note 31, at 34 (discussing formation of Super PACs in 
immediate aftermath of Citizens United). 
105 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444-62 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
106 See id. at 1473-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
107 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion) (noting current base contribution limit). All 
figures cited here are per two-year election cycle. 
108 See id. at 1443 (noting aggregate contribution limit struck down in case). 
109 See supra note 104 (discussing role of Citizens United in giving rise to Super PACs). 
110 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 40 (1976) (noting individual expenditure limit struck down in case). 
111 See Peter H. Stone, Sheldon Adelson Spent Far More on Campaign than Previously Known, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/03/sheldon-adelson-2012-
election_n_2223589.html. 
112 See Bonica et al., supra note 4, at 112-13. 
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finance limits say, will shirk their responsibilities to their other constituents.”113 
She also recognizes that alignment is linked to a specific democratic theory: “a 
populist view in which the representative ought be as close as possible to a 
transparent vehicle for plebiscitary democracy.”114 But this link is precisely the 
problem, in her view. “[S]electing one vision of good government is not 
generally an acceptable justification for limiting speech. . . . [Alignment] claims 
the superiority of a particular conception of democracy as a ground for limiting 
speech.”115 In other words, the democratic origin of the alignment interest is not 
the core of its appeal but rather its fatal flaw. 
Sullivan is correct that the primary reason for a jurisdiction to invoke 
alignment is that it is drawn to the theory of democracy that alignment represents. 
But she is wrong to suppose that there is anything illegitimate about a jurisdiction 
embracing a particular democratic theory. In fact, jurisdictions do so all the time, 
and they then cite these theories as justifications for burdening a host of 
individual rights, not just speech. Take, for example, the myriad requirements 
that states apply to candidates (especially from minor parties) seeking to be listed 
on ballots. These requirements typically are defended on the grounds that they 
“favor the traditional two-party system” and “temper the destabilizing effects of . 
. . excessive factionalism”—and they typically are upheld.116 Or consider the 
countless districts that deviate at least somewhat from the rule of one person, one 
vote. When these districts are contested, jurisdictions argue that the deviations 
are justified by their interests in compactness, congruence with political 
subdivisions, and the like.117 And they usually prevail as well.118 
Even in the campaign finance context, it is not only the alignment interest 
that entails a commitment to a particular vision of democracy. The anti-
corruption and informational interests, which Sullivan omits from her analysis, 
do so too. In a recent article, Deborah Hellman explains that corruption is a 
113 Sullivan, supra note 23, at 679. 
114 Id. at 681. This is not quite how I would describe the democratic theories with which alignment is most 
consistent. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (explaining how alignment follows from delegate 
model of representation and from majoritarianism). 
115 Id. at 680-81. Similar arguments can be found in some of the Court’s recent cases. See, e.g., 
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (plurality opinion) (“Campaign finance restrictions that 
pursue other objectives [than preventing corruption], we have explained, impermissibly inject the Government 
‘into the debate over who should govern.’” (quoting Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 
131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011))). 
116 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997) (upholding ban on fusion 
candidacies); see also, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439 (1992) (upholding ban on write-in 
candidacies based on state’s interest in avoiding “unrestrained factionalism”); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 
752, 761 (1973) (upholding deadline on party enrollment based on state’s interest in “preservation of the 
integrity of the electoral process”). 
117 See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 161-62 (1993) (upholding malapportioned districts 
resulting from “policy in favor of preserving county boundaries”); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 & n.8 
(1973) (same); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 323 (1973) (same where state “sought to avoid the 
fragmentation of such subdivisions”).  
118 See Action on Redistricting Plans, 2001-07, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 9, 2008), 
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/redsum2000/action2000.htm (showing that majority of 
redistricting lawsuits failed in 2000s cycle); see also Briffault, supra note 62, at 1767-68 (“[W]hat is striking 
about the jurisprudence of elections is the Court’s willingness to let legislatures determine some of the 
substantive values that election rules may advance . . . .”). 
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“derivative concept” that is meaningful only if one first adopts a theory of how 
an uncorrupted individual or institution would act.119 When the relevant 
individual is an officeholder and the relevant institution is a legislature, “[w]hat 
constitutes political corruption . . . depends on a theory of democracy.”120 What 
constitutes corruption, that is, depends on precisely the issue that Sullivan deems 
off-limits.121 Likewise, the rationale for notifying voters about the sources of 
campaign messages is, in the Court’s words, to “enable[] the electorate to make 
informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers.”122 This aim 
also rests on a contested view of how democracy should operate—as evidenced 
by the fact that at least one Justice disagrees with the Court’s position.123 
Sullivan might respond that the anti-corruption and informational interests 
are invalid as well.124 Perhaps money in politics should be deregulated entirely so 
as to prevent jurisdictions from picking among democratic theories. But even 
complete deregulation would not get us out of the theoretical box. If there were 
no campaign finance restrictions at all, individuals and groups would try to 
influence elections in whatever manner they thought was most beneficial to their 
interests. Candidates then would be elected, and policies enacted, based on the 
interplay of all of these individuals’ and groups’ activities.125 But this is not a 
description of a political process divorced from democratic theory. Rather, it is 
an account of some kind of pluralism—“the aggregation of self-regarding 
interests, each of which is free to seek as much representation as possible,” as 
Sullivan puts it.126 Deregulation thus involves exactly the same sort of 
democratic choice as regulation. 
Next, Post sets forth a complex theory of the First Amendment that 
distinguishes between the general domain of public discourse and an array of 
specific managerial domains. In public discourse, people freely “participat[e] in 
the ongoing and never-ending formation of public opinion,”127 and so come to 
119 Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1385, 
1389 (2013). 
120 Id. at 1394; see also Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 
CONST. COMMENT. 127, 128 (1997) (“Any adequate standard of corruption . . . must be grounded in a 
convincing theory of representation.”). 
121 Because Hellman is wary of having the Court select a theory of democracy, she argues for judicial 
deference to the elected branches’ conception of corruption. See Hellman, supra note 119, at 1410-11. This, of 
course, is almost the exact opposite of Sullivan’s position. Sullivan believes that the elected branches should not 
choose a theory of democracy at all. Hellman believes that only the elected branches should make this choice. 
122 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010). 
123 See id. at 480-85 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that disclosure 
requirements are unconstitutional because they abridge right to anonymous speech). Moreover, as soon as the 
Court recognizes an interest asserted by a jurisdiction, it too necessarily adopts a specific theory of democracy. 
See Hellman, supra note 119, at 1402 (“[W]hen the Court defines corruption, it inescapably puts forward a 
conception of the proper role of a legislator in a democracy.”). 
124 Indeed, she gestures in this direction when she criticizes contribution limits on the ground that 
“contributions may be consistent with some notions of democratic theory.” Sullivan, supra note 23, at 681 n.56. 
125 The actual preferences of voters also would play some role, even in a wholly deregulated system. 
126 Id. at 681; see also id. (“Campaign finance reformers necessarily reject pluralist assumptions about the 
operation of democracy . . . .”). 
127 POST, supra note 24, at 36. 
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“believe that government is potentially responsive to their views.”128 Post refers 
to this belief in the government’s responsiveness as “democratic legitimation,” 
and he considers its creation the central purpose of public discourse.129 In a 
managerial domain, on the other hand, “speech may be regulated in order to 
achieve the instrumental goals of the domain.”130 In the managerial domain of 
elections, for instance, Post posits the goal of “electoral integrity,” by which he 
means elections that produce “popular trust that representatives are responsive to 
public opinion.”131 
Assuming that campaign speech is part of public discourse, then, the problem 
with the alignment approach is that it requires public opinion to be measured and 
then compared to some governmental output. But public discourse 
“conceptualizes public opinion as a continuous process,” as an “unending 
unfolding” that “can never be decisively known or fixed.”132 Therefore any effort 
to gauge (and then apply) public opinion is doomed. “There is no ‘baseline’ from 
which [misalignment] can be assessed. . . . no Archimedean point[] from which 
to normalize the content of public opinion.”133 
Post’s conception of public opinion warrants several responses. First, as an 
empirical matter, political scientists have found that it is not nearly as volatile as 
he suggests. One landmark study, for example, concluded that Americans’ policy 
preferences “form meaningful patterns consistent with a set of underlying beliefs 
and values” and “do not in fact change in a capricious, whimsical, or evanescent 
fashion.”134 Second, even if public opinion is highly fluid, the applicability of the 
alignment approach is not undermined as a result. The approach holds that 
voters’ views and governmental outputs should be congruent over time. If voters’ 
views change from one period to the next, then so should the outputs. The 
approach can cope with shifting public opinion.135 And third, Post repeatedly 
argues that there is no way to tell if public opinion is “distorted”—indeed, this is 
the thrust of his critique.136 But the concept of alignment does not rely on a 
notion of “undistorted” public opinion. It takes public opinion as it finds it, and 
128 Id. at 49. 
129 See id. 
130 Id. at 81. 
131 Id. at 66. 
132 Id. at 53-54. 
133 Id.; see also id. at 156 (claiming that alignment approach “has no intrinsic answer to the obvious 
question: Who are the People?”). 
134 BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF TRENDS IN 
AMERICANS’ POLICY PREFERENCES 384-75 (1992); see also, e.g., Stuart N. Soroka & Christopher Wlezien, On 
the Limits to Inequality in Representation, 2 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 319, 319-25 (2008) (showing respondents’ 
coherent and stable preferences for taxing and spending levels over time); Joseph Daniel Ura & Christopher R. 
Ellis, Income, Preferences, and the Dynamics of Policy Responsiveness, 4 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 785, 787-89 
(2008) (same for respondents’ overall policy liberalism). 
135 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 16, at 312-13. 
136 See, e.g., POST, supra note 24, at 54 (“[L]imiting speech to prevent distortion is equivalent to freezing 
public opinion and preventing it from changing in response to new ideas and new convictions.”).   
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merely claims that officeholders’ positions and policy outcomes should 
correspond to it.137 
A different kind of answer to Post focuses not on public opinion but rather on 
the value of democratic legitimation that underpins public discourse. Democratic 
legitimation, crucially, is in essence a subjective form of alignment. It is people’s 
belief that government is responsive to their views, while alignment is the reality 
of a responsive government.138 Subjective and objective alignment may diverge, 
of course, but the more reasonable hypothesis (in the absence of empirical 
evidence) is that they typically coincide.139 It is hard to imagine, after all, what 
could be more likely to produce a feeling of alignment than actual alignment. As 
Justice Stevens remarked in Citizens United, a “Government captured by 
corporate interests,” and so misaligned in their favor, also may cause people to 
“believe” that it is “neither responsive to their needs nor willing to give their 
views a fair hearing.”140 Accordingly, it may be possible to reconcile Post’s 
theoretical framework with the alignment approach in a fairly straightforward 
fashion. If public discourse sometimes may be regulated for the sake of 
democratic legitimation, perhaps it also may be regulated for the sake of the 
alignment from which legitimation arises.141 
A final reply to Post builds on his observation that campaign speech could be 
conceptualized not as part of public discourse but instead as part of the 
managerial domain of elections. This domain’s boundaries are elastic, and, in 
Post’s words, they could be “enlarged to authorize control of [money in politics] 
that threaten[s] electoral integrity.”142 If the proper rubric is the electoral domain, 
not public discourse, then there are two further ways to reconcile Post’s theory 
with the alignment approach. First, the goal Post specifies for the domain, 
electoral integrity, is very similar to the value of democratic legitimation that is 
secured by public discourse. (The only difference between them is that integrity 
relies on elections to produce a sense of responsiveness, while legitimation relies 
on civic participation.143) Consequently, if alignment can function as a means for 
137 The one exception is the category of misalignment that hinges on divergence from the hypothetical 
voter exposed to more even campaign outlays. I concede, however, that this type of misalignment is not a 
legitimate concern under current law. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
138 See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text. I note that I am treating alignment and responsiveness 
as synonymous here, while in fact they have different technical definitions. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 16, 
at 299-302 (discussing these concepts’ differences). 
139 Because it only has become possible very recently to measure objective alignment, no study to date has 
investigated the relationship between it and subjective alignment (which can be assessed using polls). 
140 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 470 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (emphasis added); see also FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 507-08 (2007) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that “integrity . . . of democratic government” is “derived from the responsiveness of its 
law to the interests of citizens”). 
141 Post partially concedes this point when he observes that “there might be little difference” between his 
own framework and something akin to the alignment approach. POST, supra note 24, at 156. They may be 
“simply using different words to describe the identical phenomenon.” Id. 
142 Id. at 91; see also Briffault, supra note 62, at 1763 (arguing for “a distinctive jurisprudential regime for 
election speech”); Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 
77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1817 (1999) (also arguing for electoral domain detached from general First Amendment 
principles). 
143 See supra notes 128, 129, 131 and accompanying text. 
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achieving legitimation in the realm of public discourse, it should be able to do the 
same for integrity in the electoral domain. There is no reason to expect alignment 
to have different connections to these highly related, almost equivalent, aims. 
Second, once we find ourselves in the electoral domain, Post’s goal of 
electoral integrity is entitled to no particular deference. The ends of managerial 
domains are “democratically determined,”144 and there is no evidence that the 
public prefers integrity over, say, alignment. In fact, while I am aware of no 
polling on the popularity of integrity, two recent surveys found that a substantial 
majority of Americans support the delegate model of representation (to which 
alignment is closely tied) over the trustee model.145 The democratic legitimacy of 
alignment thus is at least as robust as that of integrity.  
Moreover, putting aside the vagaries of public opinion, electoral integrity is 
an odd choice for an objective because it does not appear to be linked to any 
aspect of campaign finance. Political scientists have detected no relationship 
whatsoever between levels of electoral spending or types of electoral regulation 
and people’s trust in government (a passable proxy for integrity).146 In contrast, 
as detailed in Part III, both levels of spending and types of regulation are 
connected to alignment in intuitive and empirically verifiable ways.147 Alignment 
thus has a clear practical advantage over integrity. Unlike integrity, it indeed is 
threatened by money in politics, and promoted by certain kinds of reform.  
 
II.  THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF ALIGNMENT 
 
Even if the alignment interest is permitted by First Amendment theory, it is 
not yet out of the conceptual minefield. The possibility remains that it might be 
indistinguishable from one of the multiple interests the Court has either rejected 
or downplayed in its campaign finance decisions. In this case, the theoretical 
availability of alignment would be irrelevant. In order to recognize it, the Court 
would be obligated to overturn its precedents and to resuscitate one of the 
stricken interests—in short, to launch a doctrinal revolution. Even for a future 
144 POST, supra note 24, at 81. 
145 See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND 
THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 59 (2012); Mollyann Brodie et al., The Will of the People, 
PUB. PERSPECTIVE, July/Aug. 2005, at 12; see also Cain, supra note 62, at 121 (referring to “more widely 
accepted[] delegate model”). 
146 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Citizens Deflected: Electoral Integrity and Political Reform, in CITIZENS 
DVIDED, supra note 24, at 141, 144; Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and 
Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 123 (2004) 
(finding that “public perception of corruption has almost nothing to do with activity actually taking place in the 
campaign finance system”); David M. Primo, Public Opinion and Campaign Finance: Reformers Versus 
Reality, 7 INDEPENDENT REV. 207, 215 (2002) (finding no relationship between trust in government and 
campaign spending). There also is no obvious connection between campaign finance and people’s belief that 
government listens to their views. Indeed, “Public belief in the responsiveness of the government appears to 
have risen during a period of increased campaign spending and soft money fundraising.” JOHN SAMPLES, THE 
FALLACY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 115 (2006) (emphasis added); ); see also SHAUN BOWLER & TODD 
DONOVAN, THE LIMITS OF ELECTORAL REFORM 88, 90-94 (2013) (finding that public’s attitudes toward 
political system are largely unaffected by campaign finance reforms). 
147 See infra Part III. 
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Court more amenable to regulation than the current Justices, this would be a tall 
order. 
In this Part, then, I explain why alignment is distinct from the three key 
interests—anti-corruption, anti-distortion, and equality—that have made 
appearances in the Court’s case law.148 First, as to corruption, there simply is no 
connection between misalignment and quid pro quo corruption (the only variant 
accepted by today’s Court). Misalignment is more closely related to undue 
influence corruption (endorsed by the Court in the early 2000s), but it still is not 
the same thing. The undue influence of donors is, at most, one of several means 
that can produce the end of misalignment. Second, as to distortion, the term (as 
used by the Court) refers to the skewing of electoral outcomes due to asymmetric 
campaign spending. It has nothing to do with how money in politics may affect 
officeholders’ positions or policy outcomes. 
And third, equality comes in various forms, but none of them is synonymous 
with alignment. Equality of candidate resources is an entirely orthogonal goal; 
there is no reason why evenly funded candidates should be any more aligned 
with voters than unevenly funded ones. Equality of representation actually is 
inconsistent with alignment. For there to be any kind of congruence with the 
median voter, there must be noncongruence with voters at all other points in the 
spectrum. And equality of voter influence may be conducive to the achievement 
of alignment, but it too is one of several possible means, not the end itself. It also 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for alignment to be realized. 
 
A.  Anti-Corruption 
 
The prevention of corruption is, without a doubt, the most prominent interest 
in the campaign finance case law. On one occasion, the Court even labeled it “the 
only legitimate and compelling government interest[] thus far identified for 
restricting campaign finances.”149 However, the prominence of the anti-
corruption interest is matched by the Court’s vacillation over how best to 
construe it. In Buckley itself and for about a decade thereafter, the Court mostly 
limited the concept to quid pro quo corruption: the explicit exchange of “dollars 
for political favors.”150 In the early 2000s, the Court broadened its definition to 
include “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment.”151 It was in this period 
that the Court acknowledged “the broader threat from politicians too compliant 
148 Presumably, no one would claim that alignment is identical to the informational interest that the Court 
has recognized. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 367-71 (2010) (discussing this interest). 
149 FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496 (1985). 
150 Id. at 497; see also, e.g., id. (“The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo . . . .”); Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (“To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid 
pro quo . . . the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined.”). Hints of a broader notion 
of corruption, however, can be found even in these early cases. See, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978) (referring to “corruption of elected representatives through the creation of 
political debts”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 70 (discussing “[t]he Government’s interest in deterring . . . the undue 
influence of large contributors on officeholders”). 
151 FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001). 
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with the wishes of large contributors”152 and “the danger that officeholders will 
decide issues . . . according to the wishes of those who have made large financial 
contributions.”153 And, coming full circle, the Court has reverted to its quid pro 
quo conception over the last few years. In McCutcheon, the Court baldly declared 
that “Congress may target only a specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ 
corruption.”154 
What is the relationship, then, between alignment and quid pro quo 
corruption? In brief, there is (next to) none. Alignment refers to the congruence 
of voters’ policy preferences with representatives’ positions or enacted policy.155 
Quid pro quo corruption refers to transactions in which money (or some other 
tangible asset) is traded overtly for a politician’s vote (or some other beneficial 
action).156 The two concepts are wholly unrelated. The former is concerned with 
the level of correspondence between a given popular input and a given 
governmental output. The latter scrutinizes how exactly a politician is paying 
back someone who has given her something of value. Unfortunately for the 
alignment interest, it cannot be shoehorned into the one rationale for campaign 
finance regulation that the current Court unquestionably accepts. 
The reason there may be a hint of a connection between the two concepts is 
that quid pro quo corruption may give rise to misalignment. If a politician votes a 
certain way because of a monetary benefit she received, but would have cast a 
different and more congruent vote had she not received the benefit, then the quid 
pro quo exchange induced the noncongruence. But, as noted earlier, quid pro quo 
corruption appears to be quite rare in contemporary America.157 The misaligning 
effect it could have on the political process thus is relatively limited. 
In contrast, alignment has a much stronger link to undue influence 
corruption. To say that politicians are “too compliant with” their contributors’ 
preferences,158 and inclined to “decide issues . . . according to” them,159 in 
essence is to say that politicians’ and donors’ positions are aligned. And as long 
as donors and voters have divergent views, politicians who are aligned with the 
former must be misaligned with the latter. To be unduly influenced by donors 
means not to be influenced enough by voters.160 It is because of this tight 
connection that I earlier cited the Court’s undue influence cases as the best 
152 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). 
153 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003). 
154 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014) (plurality opinion); see also, e.g., Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (stating that anti-corruption interest is “limited to quid pro quo corruption”); 
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 478-79 (2007) (plurality opinion). 
155 See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. 
156 See supra note 150 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Burke, supra note 120, at 130 (referring to 
quid pro quo corruption as “trades of votes for money”); Yasmin Dawood, Classifying Corruption, 10 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 18) (same). 
157 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
158 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). 
159 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003). 
160 See Dawood, supra note 156 (manuscript at 21 (“The wrong of undue influence . . . is that elected 
officials are disproportionately responsive to the wishes of large donors as compared to other constituents.”). 
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evidence of the alignment approach in the Court’s doctrine.161 If a future Court 
were ever to adopt the approach, it likely would rely heavily on these decisions. 
But despite these parallels, misalignment and undue influence corruption are 
not identical. First, even if contributors’ undue influence is the only mechanism 
that results in misalignment, it remains just that: a mechanism, not the outcome 
itself. The Court thus could recognize alignment as a compelling interest without 
having to revise its conception of corruption. Ends are different from means. 
Second, contributors’ undue influence is not, of course, the only mechanism that 
generates misalignment. Within the campaign finance field, it is not just donors 
but also spenders who may have a misaligning impact. If candidates align their 
positions with those of spenders who advocate for their election, then 
misalignment ensues without any undue influence by donors. And outside the 
realm of money in politics, there exist a host of additional misaligning forces. 
Even in the absence of any undue influence, partisan pressures, legislative rules, 
gerrymandered districts, and so on would still cause significant 
noncongruence.162 
Third, contributors’ undue influence does not even necessarily produce 
misalignment. If donors and voters have the same policy preferences, then extra 
sway for donors does not translate into diminished pull for voters. As discussed 
in Part III, donors and voters typically do not have the same ideal point 
distributions163—but the fact that donors’ undue influence would not give rise to 
misalignment if they did further demonstrates that the concepts are distinct. And 
fourth, at least in my view, the terminology of alignment is substantially clearer 
than that of undue influence. The Court’s phrase does not tell us how much 
influence is due to donors, nor does it help with the measurement of either 
donors’ or voters’ hold over politicians. Alignment, on the other hand, plainly 
calls for the comparison of voters’ policy preferences with officeholders’ 
positions and actual policy outcomes. Both the inputs and the outputs in this 
formulation can be quantified and then matched against each other.164 
All of this analysis also applies to a version of the anti-corruption interest 
recently introduced by Lessig. He begins with the premise that representatives 
(especially members of the U.S. House) are meant to be “‘dependent on the 
people alone.’”165 But because of their unending need for campaign funds, they 
now are dependent on not just the people but also the donors who supply these 
funds.166 The result is a “dependence corruption” in which elected officials who 
are supposed to depend exclusively on one body (“the people”) also have become 
dependent on another (“the funders”).167 In Lessig’s view, the governmental 
161 See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. 
162 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 16, at 323-36, 342-56, 360-65. 
163 See infra Part III. 
164 See id.; see also notes 56-61 and accompanying text. 
165 Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1, 
7 (2014) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison)). 
166 See id.; see also Lawrence Lessig, A Reply to Professor Hasen, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 61, 65 (2013) 
(“Politicians in our system have become dependent upon their funders. Their ‘funders’ are not ‘the people.’”). 
167 See id. 
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interest in preventing dependence corruption is compelling, and it justifies 
regulations including contribution limits and public financing (but not 
expenditure limits).168 
Like undue influence corruption, dependence corruption is closely tied to 
misalignment. When politicians are dependent on donors, they are likely to be 
aligned with them, and so misaligned with voters.169 But like undue influence 
corruption, dependence corruption also is not equivalent to misalignment. In fact, 
all four of the distinctions between undue influence corruption and misalignment 
also apply to dependence corruption. First, dependence on donors is one way in 
which misalignment can arise. It is not the end itself. Second, donor dependence 
is not the only way in which misalignment can arise. Spender dependence can be 
just as misaligning as donor dependence.170 Third, donor dependence does not 
necessarily produce misalignment. As Lessig notes, if donors and voters have the 
same preferences, then “a dependence upon ‘contributors’ could in effect be the 
same as a dependence upon voters.”171 And fourth, dependence corruption does 
not convert easily into a doctrinal standard. It provides no guidance as to how 
dependence (on donors or on voters) actually is to be assessed.172 
A final divergence between misalignment and dependence corruption relates 
to their policy prescriptions. Both theories support the validity of contribution 
limits on individuals (which are aligning and also reduce politicians’ dependence 
on donors).173 But Lessig states that his approach would uphold public financing 
programs, while the alignment approach would not shield the many such 
programs whose effects are ambiguous or misaligning.174 Lessig also maintains 
that his approach would not ratify expenditure limits, while the alignment 
approach would permit them if their impact is aligning.175 Accordingly, the 
contrasts between the methods are not so many angels dancing on the head of a 
pin. They are distinctions that make a difference. 
 
B.  Anti-Distortion 
 
168 See Lessig, supra note 165, at 19 (noting that “compelling interest” “would obviously support public 
funding systems” and “would plainly justify aggregate contribution limits”); id. at 20-21 (noting that interest 
“would not revive Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce” and “would also not reverse Citizens United v. 
FEC”).  
169 See Lessig, supra note 166, at 68 (explaining that dependence corruption makes “representatives 
responsive to funders first, and only then to citizens”). 
170 See Bruce E. Cain, Is “Dependence Corruption” the Solution to America’s Campaign Finance 
Problems?, 102 CAL. L. REV. 37, 43 (2014) (pointing out that “outside spending often reinforces a very specific 
connection between the candidate’s successful election and the group’s interests and issues”); Richard L. Hasen, 
Super PAC Contributions, Corruption, and the Proxy War Over Coordination, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 2 (2014). 
171 LESSIG, supra note 62, at 243. 
172 See Cain, supra note 170, at 44 (“Would the empirical evidence for dependence corruption be easier to 
find than quid pro quo corruption? I doubt it.”). Lessig’s one suggestion for how to measure dependence is to 
examine the time candidates spend fundraising. See Lessig, supra note 166, at 65. 
173 See supra note 168; see also infra Part IV. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. 
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A second interest that has appeared in the campaign finance case law is the 
prevention of electoral distortion. This interest first emerged in pre-Buckley 
decisions such as Automobile Workers, in which the Court expressed concern 
about the “deleterious influences on federal elections resulting from . . . large 
aggregations of capital.”176 It also turned up in decisions in the first decade after 
Buckley, in which the Court worried that the “corrosive influence of concentrated 
corporate wealth” would undermine the “integrity of the marketplace of political 
ideas.”177 But the interest did not come into its own until the 1990 case of Austin 
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,178 which upheld Michigan’s ban on 
campaign expenditures by corporations. The Court famously expounded on the 
“corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth . . . that have 
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political 
ideas.”179 Austin, however, stood for only two decades. Its holding that corporate 
expenditures could be limited was reversed in Citizens United—and the anti-
distortion interest on which its holding rested was rejected as well.180 
For present purposes, the crucial point about distortion is that, at least as 
understood by the Court, it refers to the skewing of electoral outcomes due to 
large expenditures. Distortion occurs, in the Court’s view, when wealthy entities 
spend heavily during a campaign and thus induce some number of voters to cast 
their ballots differently than they would have under conditions of more even 
outlays. This conception explains why the Austin Court concluded its opinion by 
warning of the “threat that huge corporate treasuries . . . will be used to influence 
unfairly the outcome of elections.”181 It also explains why the Court, in other 
cases, highlighted the “governmental interest in reducing . . . the influence of 
wealth on the outcomes of elections”182 and the risk that “wealthy and powerful” 
entities “may drown out other points of view” and “exert an undue influence on 
the outcome of a . . . vote.”183 As Julian Eule has observed, Austin’s theory was 
that “corporations spoke too loudly and wielded too much influence on the 
electorate.”184 
176 United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957); see also, e.g., Pipefitters Local Union 
No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 415 (1972) (noting interest in “eliminat[ing] the effect of aggregated 
wealth on federal elections”); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 115 (1948). 
177 FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986); see also, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978). 
178 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
179 Id. at 660. The Court dubbed this distortion “a different type of corruption in the political arena.” Id. 
180 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 348-56 (2010). 
181 Austin, 494 U.S. at 669. 
182 Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 755 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 
540 U.S. 93, 274 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he 
‘corrosive and distorting effects’ described in Austin are that corporations . . . will be able to convince voters of 
the correctness of their ideas.”). 
183 First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978) (noting this risk but not finding it 
present on facts of case). 
184 Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 105, 
109; see also, e.g., Briffault, supra note 31, at 922 (“Austin was rooted in concern to protect the political 
equality of voters from corporate war chests.”); Issacharoff, supra note 62, at 122; Lessig, supra note 165, at 13. 
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The definition of distortion matters because if the term denotes the skewing 
of electoral outcomes due to large expenditures, then it does not denote 
misalignment. Misalignment, again, is the lack of fit between voters’ policy 
preferences and key governmental outputs. It accepts voters’ preferences as they 
are, without seeking to convert them to some sort of pure or unadulterated 
state.185 It also compares voters’ preferences to products of the political process 
such as officeholders’ positions and actual policy outcomes. In contrast, Austin-
style distortion does not take voters’ views as it finds them. Its central aim is to 
determine how asymmetric spending changes these views relative to a 
hypothetical benchmark of more even outlays.186 Austin-style distortion also is 
indifferent to the positions that representatives adopt and the policies that in fact 
are enacted. Public opinion is its sole focus—not, as with misalignment, merely 
one side of the equation. Accordingly, it seems clear that Austin-style distortion 
and misalignment are not the same thing. The former cares only about the effect 
of campaign money on voters; the latter only about its impact on officeholders.187 
To be sure, Austin-style distortion is not the only kind of distortion that one 
could imagine.188 For instance, one could define an aligned political system—a 
system in which voters’ policy preferences are congruent with key governmental 
outputs—as an undistorted state. Then any divergence from this state (that is, any 
misalignment) would constitute distortion.189 But the availability of such 
conceptual moves is not particularly relevant. The anti-distortion interest does 
not encompass every sort of skew that a commentator can concoct. Rather, it 
includes only the specific phenomenon that the Court has described in its 
decisions on money in politics: the shifting of voters’ preferences as a result of 
lopsided campaign spending. Whatever the case may be for other types of 
distortion, this phenomenon simply is not misalignment.190 
 
C.  Equality 
 
The final interest in the campaign finance case law—one long championed 
by liberals191 but never accepted by a majority of the Court—is equality. In 
185 But see supra notes 40-41 (discussing another form of misalignment, not advocated here, that does 
involve distortion of voters’ preferences due to uneven spending). 
186 See Sullivan, supra note 23, at 677 (“[T]he concept of ‘distortion’ assumes a baseline of ‘undistorted’ 
voter views and preferences.”). 
187 Cf. Lessig, supra note 165, at 15 (also distinguishing between “two paradigms—regulating speech that 
corrupts government officials (constitutional) and regulating speech said to corrupt citizens (unconstitutional)”). 
188 See Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign 
Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1078 (1985) (noting indeterminacy of concept of distortion); David 
Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 
236, 277 (1991) (“The problem, of course, is in defining when the marketplace is . . . ‘distorted’ . . . .”). 
189 Cf. Richard L. Hasen, Fixing Washington, 126 HARV. L. REV. 550, 572 (2012) (claiming that “Lessig’s 
idea that campaign money distorts policy outcomes sounds very much like the language used by the Supreme 
Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce”). 
190 Cf. Hasen, supra note 26, at 311 (conceding that Lessig’s position “differs in some particulars from the 
equality argument in Austin”).  
191 See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1204 (1994); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and 
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Buckley, the Court considered equality justifications for expenditure limits on 
candidates and on individuals.192 It spurned the justifications in both cases, 
declaring in perhaps the field’s best-known line that “the concept that 
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to 
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment.”193 The Court adhered to its position on candidate equality in 
subsequent cases such as Davis v. FEC194 and Bennett. In Bennett, faced with a 
“trigger” provision that allocated matching funds to publicly financed candidates 
if their opponents spent heavily, the Court commented that “it is not legitimate 
for the government to attempt to equalize electoral opportunities in this 
manner.”195 The Court also stuck to its guns on individual equality in Citizens 
United. Quoting Buckley, it reaffirmed that “the Government has [no] interest ‘in 
equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome 
of elections.’”196 
From these decisions (as well as the academic literature), we can glean three 
kinds of equality. The first is equality of candidate resources, referred to by 
Hasen and Daniel Lowenstein as equality of outputs.197 This sort of equality is 
present when candidates have the same amount of money to spend in their 
campaigns, but is absent when one candidate enjoys a financial advantage over 
her opponent. The second, only hinted at in the doctrine but developed more fully 
by scholars such as Yasmin Dawood and Sullivan, is equality of representation. 
This variant exists when every voter is represented equally, but not when 
“elected officials are disproportionately responsive” to their constituents.198 And 
the third is equality of voter influence over the political process, dubbed equality 
of inputs by Hasen and Lowenstein.199 Voters have equal influence (at least from 
a financial perspective) when they each are able to donate and spend the same 
amount of money. But they lack it when some voters are able to deploy greater 
resources than others. 
Are any of these forms of equality equivalent to alignment? If so, then 
alignment would be an illegitimate interest under the Court’s precedent, but I 
believe the answer is no. To begin with, equality of candidate resources (i.e., 
output equality) is an essentially unrelated concept. A candidate may disburse 
Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1162 (1994); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1392 (1994). 
192 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-59 (1976). 
193 Id. at 48-49; see also id. at 49 n.55 (rejecting position that “First Amendment permits Congress to 
abridge the rights of some persons to engage in political expression in order to enhance the relative voice of 
other segments of our society”). 
194 Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
195 Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011); see also 
Davis, 554 U.S. at 742 (“The argument that a candidate’s speech may be restricted in order to ‘level electoral 
opportunities’ has ominous implications . . . .”). 
196 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48). 
197 See Hasen, supra note 26, at 312; Daniel Hays Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic: Campaign Finance 
and the First Amendment After Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 381, 393 (1992). 
198 Dawood, supra note 156 (manuscript at 21); see also Sullivan, supra note 23, at 678 (referring to 
“legislators’ unequal responsiveness to different citizens”). 
199 See Hasen, supra note 26, at 312; Lowenstein, supra note 197, at 393. 
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just as much money as her opponent during a campaign, but then flout her 
constituents’ preferences once in office. Conversely, a candidate may outspend 
her opponent (or be outspent), but then abide by voters’ wishes after being 
elected. There is no logical link between a candidate’s relative spending and her 
subsequent alignment with her constituents. In fact, there is not even much of a 
correlation between these variables. Even if equal spending produces more 
competitive races, candidates who squeak into office are only barely more 
aligned with voters than candidates who prevail in landslides.200 In addition, the 
effect of public financing systems that equalize candidate resources has been to 
increase misalignment, not to reduce it.201 
Next, equality of representation actually is profoundly at odds with 
alignment. Alignment is the congruence of governmental outputs with the views 
of the median voter. As long as voters diverge in their opinions, such congruence 
can be achieved only if there is noncongruence with the views of voters at all 
other points in the distribution. Alignment at the median requires misalignment at 
all other locations. Moreover, this conclusion holds even if we use Dawood or 
Sullivan’s formulation of equal responsiveness.202 When the preferences of the 
median voter change, governmental outputs must change in tandem in order to 
maintain alignment. But when voters’ preferences shift without affecting the 
position of the median, governmental outputs must not shift at all. Alignment 
thus is possible only if “elected officials” indeed “are disproportionately 
responsive” to their constituents.203 
This leaves us with equality of voter influence, which is precisely the concept 
that Hasen claims is indistinguishable from alignment. Alignment, in his view, 
amounts to “a call for equality of political inputs,” an effort to “reduce the voice 
of some to enhance the relative voice of others.”204 Hasen clearly is correct that 
equality of voter influence and alignment are related. To see why, assume that 
200 See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
136, 145 (2001) (finding that shift from 30% margin of victory to perfect tie increases candidate convergence 
by only 0.069 points on 0 to 1 scale); Thomas L. Brunell & Bernard Grofman, Evaluating the Impact of 
Redistricting on District Homogeneity, Political Competition, and Political Extremism in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, 1962 to 2006, in DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT: MAKING INSTITUTIONS WORK 117, 
131–32 (Margaret Levi et al. eds., 2008) (showing almost no relationship between Democratic share of two-
party House vote and House member’s voting record). 
201 See infra Section III.C; see also Lessig, supra note 166, at 66 (explaining that policies that addressed 
dependence corruption would not produce “equality of candidate funding” but rather “government-funded 
inequality”).  
202 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. “[R]esponsiveness differs from alignment in that it refers to 
the rate at which these outputs change given some shift in public opinion. Alignment, in contrast, denotes 
whether or not the outputs are congruent with the public’s preferences.” Stephanopoulos, supra note 16, at 301. 
203 Dawood, supra note 156 (manuscript at 21). The implication of this analysis, of course, is that equal 
representation is an unattainable ideal. As long as voters do not all share the same preferences, governmental 
outputs inevitably will be better aligned with (and more responsive to) some groups’ views than others’. An 
additional point is that the alignment approach does treat all voters equally in the initial stage of determining the 
position of the median. It is only after this position has been ascertained that the approach begins treating voters 
unequally. 
204 Hasen, supra note 26, at 312 (making this argument with respect to Lessig’s goal of preventing 
dependence corruption); see also Cain, supra note 170, at 41 (agreeing that “that equality considerations 
underlie the particular dependency problem that Lessig is concerned with”). 
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candidates’ positions are entirely a product of the money that voters donate to 
them or spend on their behalf. (Assume also that candidates aim to maximize the 
sum of these donations and expenditures.205) Under the status quo, different 
voters deploy vastly different resources, and so candidates’ positions gravitate 
toward the voters with the most funds to offer.206 But in a regime in which all 
voters offered the same funding possibilities, candidates would have a powerful 
incentive to shift their stances toward the median. The median is where 
candidates would be able to secure the most money, and, by stipulation here, 
resource maximization drives candidate positioning. Alignment thus would 
follow naturally from equal voter influence.207 
Despite this connection, alignment and equal voter influence are not 
equivalent, largely for reasons that have been alluded to already. First, even if 
equal voter influence is a necessary and sufficient condition for alignment to 
arise, it still is just a condition, not the actual objective. It may yield alignment by 
inducing candidates to move toward the median, but yielding something is not 
the same as being something. It thus is beside the point that a regulation that 
promotes equal voter influence also may promote alignment. As Justice Kagan 
pointed out in her dissent in Bennett, “No special rule of automatic invalidation 
applies to statutes having some connection to equality; like any other laws, they 
pass muster when supported by an important enough government interest.”208 
Second, equal voter influence is not a necessary condition for alignment to 
arise. Imagine that a jurisdiction randomly selects half of its voters and gives 
each of them a sum of money that they must donate or spend during the next 
campaign. Imagine also that the jurisdiction bans the other half of its voters from 
deploying any electoral resources at all. The inequality of voter influence in this 
example could not be starker. Yet alignment still would ensue because candidates 
still would have a strong incentive to shift their positions toward the median. The 
random selection would make the distribution of subsidized voters identical to 
that of all voters, and thus would preserve the median as the point at which 
candidate funding is maximized.209 
Third, equal voter influence is not a sufficient condition for alignment either. 
If candidates’ stances are wholly a function of the funds deployed by voters on 
their behalf, and if there are only two candidates in a race, then convergence at 
205 Assume further that all campaign resources are supplied by voters (and not by parties, corporations, 
unions, etc.). 
206 See infra Section III.B. 
207 This is a variant of Anthony Downs’s famous argument that vote-maximizing candidates will converge 
on the median voter. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 114-27 (1957). If 
candidates’ positions are entirely a function of the funds deployed on their behalf, and if all voters deploy equal 
funds, then resource-maximizing candidates also will converge on the median voter. 
208 Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2845 (2011) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting); see also Hasen, supra note 26, at 308 (“[A] campaign finance law justified on [legitimate] grounds 
should not become unconstitutional if the law incidentally promotes political equality.”); Lessig, supra note 
166, at 66-67. 
209 This point also stands with respect to certain unequal funding schemes that do not employ random 
selection. For example, if the half of voters closer to the median received subsidies, and the half of voters 
farther from it were barred from deploying any resources, then alignment again would follow despite the 
inequality. 
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the median occurs under conditions of perfect input equality. But the introduction 
of additional candidates causes this relationship to break down. With three or 
more contestants, resource-maximizing candidates garner more funds by 
positioning themselves at different points along the spectrum, not by clustering in 
the middle (where they can be outflanked by their opponents). As Gary Cox has 
explained, “when there are more than two candidates competing under [standard 
American rules], equilibria are noncentrist; rational [resource]-seeking politicians 
have an incentive to avoid bunching at the median.”210 
Finally, the assumption on which the link between equal voter influence and 
alignment relies—that candidates’ positions stem from the funds donated to or 
spent for them by voters, and from nothing else—is obviously wrong. 
Candidates’ positions actually stem from all sorts of other sources too: their own 
ideologies, their parties’ platforms, franchise and party regulations, the views 
(rather than dollars) of their primary and general electorates, etc.211 In the real 
world, then, alignment does not necessarily follow from equal voter influence, 
even if candidates are hungry for resources and there are only two candidates per 
race. Equal voter influence may have an aligning effect, but so too may several 
other factors, and its impact easily may be offset by forces pushing in the 
opposite direction. Accordingly, equal voter influence has no stronger claim to 
constituting alignment itself than do any of the other aligning elements that dot 
the electoral landscape. It simply is one such element among many.212 
 
III. THE EMPIRICS OF ALIGNMENT 
 
It is not enough, though, to show that alignment is conceptually distinct from 
the anti-corruption, anti-distortion, and equality interests. No matter which 
interest is asserted in a campaign finance case, the Court carefully scrutinizes the 
connection between the interest and the policy that is being defended.213 For 
alignment to serve as a viable rationale, it thus must be established that money in 
politics produces misalignment, and that the regulation of such money promotes 
alignment. The burden of proof also is heavier for alignment than for other, more 
familiar interests. As the Court made clear in Shrink Missouri, “The quantum of 
empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny . . . will vary up 
or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.”214 
210 Gary W. Cox, Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 903, 
912 (1990). 
211 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 16, at 323-36, 342-56, 360-65. 
212 Moreover, even if all of this analysis is unconvincing and equal voter influence still seems identical to 
alignment, the Court may be more receptive to arguments about input (rather than output) equality. See Hasen, 
supra note 64, at 1003; Lowenstein, supra note 197, at 395 (noting that “the [Court’s] hostility seems to have 
been directed primarily at equality of outputs”). 
213 See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000) (holding that contribution 
limits must be “closely drawn” to serve “sufficiently important interest”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 
(1976) (applying “exacting scrutiny” to expenditure limits). 
214 Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 391; see also Renata Strause & Daniel P. Tokaji, Biulding a Record for 
the Next Court 26 (Apr. 22, 2014) (“A strong record is essential both to document the interests served by 
legislation, and to show that it is appropriately tailored.”); Strauss, supra note 57, at 1388, 1389. 
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In this Part, then, I survey the empirical evidence on both the misaligning 
effects of campaign finance and the aligning effects of campaign finance reform. 
This evidence—most of which has emerged only in the last few years215—falls 
into three main categories. First, numerous studies examine the relationship 
between governmental outputs and the preferences of poor, middle-class, and 
rich Americans. Most of them find that the outputs are tied more closely to the 
wishes of the rich than to those of any other group. Second, a smaller set of 
studies address the same issue but with respect to donors as opposed to non-
donors. Their results are even more unequivocal: The influence of donors dwarfs 
that of non-donors. And third, a handful of very recent studies explore the 
implications of campaign finance regulations for alignment. They conclude that 
individual contribution limits and certain kinds of public financing are aligning, 
but that party and PAC contribution limits and other kinds of public financing are 
misaligning. Because of the emphasis that Shrink Missouri placed on actual data, 
I review this scholarship at some length in the pages that follow. 
 
A. The Influence of the Affluent 
 
The topic of differential representation by income group burst onto the 
political science stage with the 2008 publication of Larry Bartels’s Unequal 
Democracy.216 Like many scholars before him, Bartels quantified voters’ 
preferences using survey responses and officeholders’ (here U.S. senators’) 
positions using roll call votes.217 But, unlike most previous work, Bartels did not 
treat public opinion as a single undifferentiated mass. Instead, he computed 
separate estimates of the attitudes of low-income, middle-income, and high-
income respondents.218 Analyzing the links between these estimates and senators’ 
voting records, he found that the views of the poor exerted no influence 
whatsoever, the views of the middle-class exerted a modest influence, and the 
views of the rich exerted a much greater influence.219 As he summed up his 
results (which are displayed in Figure 2), “senators in this period [1989-1994] 
were vastly more responsive to affluent constituents than to constituents of 
modest means.”220 
215 A landmark 2005 report lamented that “political scientists have paid less attention to issues of 
differential government responsiveness than they should,” and declared that “[n]owhere is the need for 
additional, more sophisticated research more obvious than for understanding how . . . flows of money affect 
U.S. politics and governance.” Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol, Studying Inequality and American 
Democracy: Findings and Challenges, in INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND 
WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN 214, 222 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005). Much of the research 
that I discuss in this Part was undertaken in response to this report. 
216 LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 
(2008). Earlier work by both Bartels and Martin Gilens also addressed this topic. See Larry M. Bartels, 
Economic Inequality and Political Representation (Aug. 2005); Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic 
Responsiveness, 69 PUB. OPINION Q. 778 (2005). 
217 See BARTELS, supra note 216, at 254-55. 
218 See id. at 257-58. 
219 See id. at 259-62. 
220 Id. at 253. 
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Bartels’s finding of misalignment221 in favor of the rich subsequently was 
extended in multiple directions by other scholars. First, Christopher Ellis,222 Jesse 
Rhodes and Brian Schaffner,223 and Chris Tausanovitch224 all determined that 
House members’ voting records also are more responsive to the preferences of 
the affluent than to those of other individuals. Rhodes, Schaffner, and 
Tausanovitch generated especially robust results by using far larger samples than 
those to which Bartels had access: a private vendor’s database of 265 million 
people in Rhodes and Schaffner’s case,225 and a “super-survey” combining five 
earlier surveys in Tausanovitch’s.226 Ellis, for his part, probed some of the factors 
that may explain variations in the level of pro-rich misalignment. He found that 
the poor are worst represented “in districts represented by Republicans, in 
districts with high median incomes, and in districts that are electorally safe.”227 
Second, in his landmark 2012 book, Affluence and Influence,228 Martin 
Gilens discovered that there also is outcome (as opposed to preference) 
misalignment in favor of the wealthy. Gilens compiled responses to thousands of 
survey questions over multiple decades, and used these responses to estimate 
income groups’ opinions on a host of national policy issues.229 He then 
laboriously tracked whether each policy asked about by a survey actually was 
enacted by the federal government during the next four years.230 With respect to 
issues about which income groups disagreed, Gilens found clear responsiveness 
to the preferences of respondents at the ninetieth percentile. As their support for a 
policy increased, the odds of the policy’s enactment increased steadily as well.231 
But Gilens found no responsiveness at all to the preferences of respondents at the 
221 Technically, Bartels analyzed responsiveness, not alignment. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 16, at 
299-302 (discussing these concepts’ differences). 
222 See Ellis, supra note 35, at 7; Christopher Ellis, Social Context and Economic Biases in 
Representation, 75 J. POL. 773, 779 (2013) [hereinafter Ellis, Social Context]; Christopher Ellis, Understanding 
Economic Biases in Representation: Income, Resources, and Policy Representation in the 110th House, 65 POL. 
RES. Q. 938, 943 (2012) [hereinafter Ellis, Understanding Biases]. 
223 See Jesse H. Rhodes & Brian F. Schaffner, Economic Inequality and Representation in the U.S. House: 
A New Approach Using Population-Level Data 29 (Apr. 7, 2013). 
224 See Chris Tausanovitch, Income and Representation in the United States Congress 22. 
225 See Rhodes & Schaffner, supra note 223, at 2. 
226 See Tausanovitch, supra note 224, at 12-13. Tausanovitch also found, however, that if legislators were 
equally responsive to all income groups’ preferences, their voting records would not be dramatically different 
from the status quo. See id. at 28-32. 
227 Ellis, Social Context, supra note 222, at 781; see also Ellis, supra note 35, at 30 (reporting similar 
results); John D. Griffin & Brian Newman, Voting Power, Policy Representation, and Disparities in Voting’s 
Rewards, 75 J. POL. 52, 56 (2013) (finding that “win ratio” measuring likelihood that member of Congress votes 
consistent with constituent’s preferences is about 4.5 points higher for high-income earners than for low-income 
earners); cf. Lawrence R. Jacobs & Benjamin I. Page, Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?, 99 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 107, 114, 117 (2005) (finding that preferences of business leaders have much larger impact on positions of 
foreign policy officials than do preferences of general public). 
228 MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN 
AMERICA (2012). 
229 See id. at 50-62. 
230 See id. at 60. 
231 See id. at 80. Specifically, as the share of respondents at the ninetieth percentile favoring a policy rose 
from 10% to 90%, the odds of the policy’s enactment rose from 10% to 50%. See id. 
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tenth or fiftieth percentiles.232 As he put it (and as shown in Figure 2), “when 
preferences between the well-off and the poor [or middle-class] diverge, 
government policy bears absolutely no relationship to the degree of support or 
opposition among the poor [or middle-class].”233 
 
FIGURE 2: FINDINGS OF PRO-AFFLUENT MISALIGNMENT BY BARTELS234 AND 
GILENS235 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Third, Patrick Flavin236 and Elizabeth Rigby and Gerald Wright237 
determined that pro-rich outcome misalignment exists at the state level as well. 
232 See id. For respondents at both of these percentiles, the odds of a policy’s enactment stayed constant at 
about 30% no matter what share of the respondents supported the policy.  
233 Id. at 81; see also Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, 
Interest Groups, and Average Citizens 15-20, 29 (Apr. 9, 2014) (reporting similar results and also determining 
that business-oriented interest groups have larger impact on policy enactment than mass-based groups). 
234 Larry M. Bartels, Economic Inequality and Political Representation 52 (Aug. 2005). 
235 GILENS, supra note 228, at 80. 
236 See Patrick Flavin, Income Inequality and Policy Representation in the American States, 40 AM. POL. 
RES. 29 (2011). 
237 See Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C. Wright, Whose Statehouse Democracy? Policy Responsiveness to 
Poor Versus Rich Constituents in Poor Versus Rich States, in WHO GETS REPRESENTED 189 (Peter K. Enns & 
Christopher Wlezien eds., 2011). 
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Flavin analyzed overall policy liberalism, taking into account state laws in twenty 
different domains, as well as a series of hot-button issues such as the death 
penalty, abortion, and gun control.238 In all of these areas, he found that “citizens 
with low incomes receive little substantive political representation in the policy 
decisions made by state governments.”239 Similarly, Rigby and Wright 
considered aggregate indices of state economic and social policy.240 In both 
cases, they too discovered greater responsiveness to the preferences of wealthier 
individuals.241 
Lastly, Ellis242 and David Weakliem et al.,243 respectively, studied how 
misalignment in favor of the affluent varies temporally and internationally. Ellis 
calculated the relative proximity to their House members of individuals in the top 
income tercile versus individuals in the bottom income tercile over the 1972-
2008 period.244 He found that the representational advantage enjoyed by the 
wealthy increased fivefold from the beginning of this era to the end.245 Weakliem 
et al. examined the extent to which income inequality in other countries reflects 
the preferences of different income groups.246 They determined that, abroad, the 
views of individuals at the eightieth income percentile correspond most closely to 
levels of inequality, and the views of individuals at the fiftieth and ninety-ninth 
percentiles are about equally influential.247 Pro-rich misalignment thus exists in 
other countries, but is not as stark as in America.248 
While the conclusion that the rich are better represented than other classes is 
widely accepted in the literature, it has been subjected to at least two critiques. 
The first is largely data-driven. Scholars such as Peter Enns, Robert Erikson, 
Stuart Soroka, Joseph Ura, and Christopher Wlezien have argued that different 
income groups’ preferences actually do not diverge very much.249 If this claim is 
238 See Flavin, supra note 236, at 40-41. 
239 Id. at 44. While the coefficients for low-income opinion were always lower than the coefficients for 
middle-income and high-income opinion, the latter two coefficients were not always distinguishable. See id. at 
41-45. 
240 See Rigby & Wright, supra note 237, at 195-99. 
241 See id. at 217. Like Flavin, Rigby and Wright also sometimes found that the coefficients for middle-
income and high-income opinion were indistinguishable. See id. at 207-17.  
242 See Ellis, supra note 35. 
243 See David L. Weakliem et al., By Popular Demand: The Effect of Public Opinion on Income Inequality, 
4 COMP. SOCIOLOGY 261 (2005). 
244 See Ellis, supra note 35, at 5-10. 
245 See id. at 9 (noting that representational gap averaged one point from 1972 to 1994 but five points in 
2004 and 2008). But see GILENS, supra note 228, at 201 (finding that rich-poor gap with respect to outcome 
alignment peaked in 1980s and was smaller in earlier and later years). 
246 See Weakliem et al., supra note 243, at 265-73. 
247 See id. at 276. 
248 Further extensions of Bartels’s initial finding include James N. Druckman & Lawrence R. Jacobs, 
Segmented Representation: The Reagan White House and Disproportionate Responsiveness, in WHO GETS 
REPRESENTED, supra note 237, at 166, 179-80 (finding that President Reagan’s public statements on economic 
policy best reflected views of wealthy respondents to administration’s polls), and Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C. 
Wright, Political Parties and Representation of the Poor in the American States 5 (Apr. 6, 2011) (finding that 
candidates’ positions at all levels are most responsive to preferences of high-income groups). 
249 See Yosef Bhatti & Robert S. Erikson, How Poorly Are the Poor Represented in the U.S. Senate?, in 
WHO GETS REPRESENTED, supra note 237, at 223, 236; Peter K. Enns & Christopher Wlezien, Group Opinion 
and the Study of Representation, in WHO GETS REPRESENTED, supra note 237, at 1, 5; Stuart N. Soroka & 
Christopher Wlezien, On the Limits to Inequality in Representation, 2 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 319, 321 (2008); 
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correct, then alignment cannot vary significantly by income stratum.250 But the 
claim only seems to be correct with respect to relatively crude measures of 
people’s preferences, such as their ideological self-placement251 and their views 
on governmental spending by issue area.252 More sophisticated metrics that rely 
on people’s answers to a battery of policy questions, of the sort employed by 
Gilens253 and Tausanovitch254 in particular, indeed find substantial differences 
between income groups’ preferences. The data-driven objection thus appears to 
be an artifact of less advanced approaches to ascertaining public opinion. 
The second critique is that even if there is misalignment in favor of the rich, 
it could result from their higher level of non-monetary participation (e.g., voting, 
volunteering, attending meetings, contacting officials, etc.).255 In this case, the 
misalignment would be the product not of money in politics but rather of 
heightened civic engagement—generally considered a good thing. This 
possibility, though, has been considered explicitly, and then rejected, by both 
Bartels and Ellis.256 These scholars ran models in which they included controls 
for several forms of non-monetary participation (as well as respondents’ 
education and knowledge).257 These variables often were associated with higher 
levels of alignment, but their inclusion never eliminated (or even much 
dampened) the statistical significance of income.258 In Bartels’s words, 
“Significant disparities in responsiveness to rich and poor constituents do still 
appear even after allowing for differences attributable to turnout, knowledge, and 
contacting.”259 
Joseph Daniel Ura & Christopher R. Ellis, Income, Preferences, and the Dynamics of Policy Responsiveness, 4 
PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 785, 785 (2008); Christopher Wlezien & Stuart N. Soroka, Inequality in Policy 
Responsiveness, in WHO GETS REPRESENTED, supra note 237, at 285, 287. 
250 See Bhatti & Erikson, supra note 249, at 233; Soroka & Wlezien, supra note 249, at 325; Ura & Ellis, 
supra note 249, at 792; Wlezien & Soroka, supra note 249, at 287. 
251 See Bhatti & Erikson, supra note 249, at 233 (using this approach); cf. Ura & Ellis, supra note 249, at 
788 (using people’s overall policy liberalism). 
252 See Enns & Wlezien, supra note 249, at 5 (using this approach); Soroka & Wlezien, supra note 249, at 
321 (same); Wlezien & Soroka, supra note 249, at 287 (same). 
253 See Martin Gilens, Preference Gaps and Inequality in Representation, 42 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 335, 
335 (2009) (noting that his “data set of policy preferences across income groups covers a far broader range of 
issues and shows dramatically greater differences between the preferences of low- and high-income 
Americans”). 
254 See Tausanovitch, supra note 224, at 15 (explaining that ideal points calculated using array of policy 
questions “give[] us more information about the location of individuals in the policy space” than ideological 
self-placements); see also Patrick Flavin, Differences in Policy Preference and Priories Across Income Groups 
in American Public Opinion 8, 13 (2009) (finding that even with respect to governmental spending by issue 
area, sizeable differences in income group opinion appear if more specific policies are asked about). 
255 For some of the voluminous literature on the higher participation of wealthier individuals, see 
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 145, at 15, 124, Benjamin I. Page et al., Democracy and the Policy Preferences 
of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 51, 54 (2013), and Joe Soss & Lawrence R. Jacobs, The Place 
of Inequality: Non-Participation in the American Polity, 124 POL. SCI. Q. 95, 97 (2009). 
256 See BARTELS, supra note 216, at 275-81; Ellis, Understanding Biases, supra note 222, at 944-46. 
257 See id. 
258 See id. 
259 See BARTELS, supra note 216, at 277; see also Ellis, Understanding Biases, supra note 222, at 948 
(“[O]nly a small part of this representation gap can be explained by patterns of participation, knowledge, [or] 
education . . . .”); cf. Rhodes & Schaffner, supra note 223, at 31-32 (finding that result of unequal 
responsiveness holds even after limiting analysis to voters). 
                                                                                                                         
 
Aligning Campaign Finance 38 
The inference that Bartels drew from this result is that the larger campaign 
donations of the affluent must explain the misalignment in their favor.260 Gilens 
speculated in the same vein in his book, claiming that “[m]oney—the ‘mother’s 
milk’ of politics—is the root of representational inequality.”261 But neither 
Bartels nor Gilens, nor any of the other scholars discussed in this Section, were 
able to provide any direct support for this hypothesis. I turn in the next Section, 
then, to scholars who have mustered actual evidence of the misaligning effects of 
campaign contributions. Their work is the strongest proof to date that the 
alignment interest is threatened by money in politics. 
 
B. The Influence of Donors 
 
If there is one thing that political scientists have learned about the small slice 
of Americans who give money to candidates, it is that they are nothing like their 
peers who do not give money. With respect to demographics, surveys carried out 
by Peter Francia et al.,262 Clyde Wilcox et al.,263 and the Institute for Politics, 
Democracy, and the Internet264 all have found that individuals who contribute at 
least $200 to federal candidates are “overwhelmingly wealthy, highly educated, 
male, and white.”265 In 2004, for example, 58% of these donors were male, 69% 
were older than fifty, 78% had a family income above $100,000, and 91% had a 
college degree.266 In 2012, these donors amounted to just 0.4% of the population, 
but supplied 64% of the funds received by candidates from individuals.267 
Likewise, with respect to ideology, study after study has concluded that 
donors hold more extreme views than the public at large. While the ideal point 
distribution for the public is normal, with a single peak in the moderate 
middle,268 the distribution for donors is strikingly bimodal, with one peak in the 
far left and another in the far right. This result is robust to multiple analytic 
approaches. It holds for donors to congressional candidates, whom Joseph 
260 See BARTELS, supra note 216, at 280 (“[T]he data are consistent with the hypothesis that senators 
represented their campaign contributors to the exclusion of other constituents.”). 
261 GILENS, supra note 228, at 10. 
262 See FRANCIA ET AL., supra note 4 (carrying out survey in 1996). 
263 See Clyde Wilcox et al., With Limits Raised, Who Will Give More? The Impact of BCRA on Individual 
Donors, in LIFE AFTER REFORM: WHEN THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT MEETS POLITICS 61 
(Michael J. Malbin ed., 2003) (carrying out survey in 2000). 
264 See INST. FOR POL., DEMOCRACY, AND THE INTERNET, SMALL DONORS AND ONLINE GIVING: A STUDY 
OF DONORS TO THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (2006) [hereinafter IPDI STUDY] (carrying out survey in 
2004). 
265 FRANCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 16. 
266 See IPDI STUDY, supra note 264, at 12; see also FRANCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 28; Wesley Y. Joe et 
al., Do Small Donors Improve Representation? Some Answers from Recent Gubernatorial and State Legislative 
Elections 19 tbl.1 (Aug. 28-31, 2008) (reporting similar results for donors to state legislative races); Wilcox et 
al., supra note 263, at 65. 
267 See Donor Demographics, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/ 
donordemographics.php?cycle=2012&filter=A (last visited Aug. 1, 2014). 
268 See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 5, at 536-37; Seth E. Masket & Hans Noel, Serving Two Masters: 
Using Referenda to Assess Partisan Versus Dyadic Legislative Representation, 20 POL. RES. Q. 1, 9 (2011); 
Shor, supra note 61, at 22. 
                                                 
 
Aligning Campaign Finance 39 
Bafumi and Michael Herron269 and Rhodes and Schaffner270 both surveyed. It 
holds for donors to all candidates over the 1972-2012 span of the American 
National Election Survey, as reported by Michael Barber.271 It holds for donors in 
all fifty states, as also reported by Barber based on the Cooperative 
Congressional Election Study.272 And it holds as well if donors’ views are 
determined not through survey responses but rather through the ideologies of the 
candidates to whom they choose to contribute. Using this last approach, Barber, 
Adam Bonica, Nolan McCarty, and others have produced charts that reveal the 
bimodality of donor opinion in arresting detail.273 
The distinctiveness of donors would matter less if they gave money for non-
ideological reasons (such as personal connections or a desire for access). In this 
case, the recipients of the contributions would not necessarily be ideologically 
extreme, and the contributions would not necessarily exert a misaligning 
influence. But surveys carried out by Barber,274 Wesley Joe et al.,275 and Wilcox 
et al.276 all found that the most important reason given by donors for their 
contributions is candidates’ ideological proximity to them. As Barber put it, 
“ideological considerations are more likely to be rated as extremely important by 
donors than access-related motivations or motivations related to personal 
connections to the candidate.”277 In addition, studies by Barber, Michael Ensley, 
Bertram Johnson, Raymond La Raja, Walter Stone, and others all determined that 
the more extreme candidates are, the more money they raise from individual 
donors.278 Donors’ survey responses, then, are more than mere words. Their 
replies are corroborated by their tendency actually to contribute more heavily to 
candidates who share their immoderate views. 
269 See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 5, at 537 (showing that donor ideal point distribution is more 
bimodal than analogous voter distribution). 
270 See Rhodes & Schaffner, supra note 223, at 34 (finding that variance of donor opinion is 50% higher 
than that of voter opinion). 
271 See Barber, supra note 34, at 15 (showing that donors are more extreme than non-donors in each 
survey year); see also id. at 15-17 (showing that donors remain more ideological even after controls are added 
for non-monetary forms of participation).  
272 See id. at 16 (showing that donors are more extreme than non-donors in each state). 
273 See NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 
162 (2006) (using soft money donations to national parties); Barber, supra note 34, at 20 (using donations to 
state legislative candidates); Michael Barber, Access Versus Ideology: Why PACs and Individuals Contribute to 
Campaigns 11 (Dec. 3, 2013) (using donations to state and federal candidates); Bonica, supra note 2, at 27 
(finding same bimodal distribution for donors generally and Fortune 500 executives specifically); Bonica et al., 
supra note 4, at 115 (same for small donors, donors in top 0.01% of income distribution, and Forbes 400 and 
Fortune 500 donors). 
274 See Barber, supra note 273, at 6-8 (surveying donors to federal candidates in 2012). 
275 See Joe et al., supra note 266, at 22 tbl.3 (surveying donors to state candidates in 2006). 
276 Wilcox et al., supra note 263, at 68 (surveying donors to federal candidates in 2000 and also reporting 
results of 1996 Francia et al. survey). 
277 Barber, supra note 273, at 8. 
278 See Barber, supra note 34, at 23-29 (analyzing state legislative candidates); Raymond J. La Raja & 
Brian F. Schaffner, Do Party-Centered Campaign Finance Laws Increase Funding for Moderates and 
Challengers? 19-20 (Jan. 8-11, 2014) (same); see also Michael J. Ensley, Individual Campaign Contributions 
and Candidate Ideology, 138 PUB. CHOICE 221, 227 (2009) (analyzing U.S. House candidates); Bertram 
Johnson, Individual Contributions: A Fundraising Advantage for the Ideologically Extreme?, 38 AM. POL. 
RESEARCH 890, 899 (2010) (same); Walter J. Stone & Elizabeth N. Simas, Candidate Valence and Ideological 
Positions in U.S. House Elections, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 371, 381 (2010) (same). 
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In combination, donors’ abundant resources, policy extremism, and 
ideological giving contribute to severe misalignment in their favor. Bafumi and 
Herron used the voting records of members of Congress and the survey responses 
of donors to plot their ideal point distributions in a common policy space.279 
Bonica used data on who gave and received all disclosed campaign contributions 
to do the same.280 Both studies found that the distributions of donors and 
members of Congress are more or less identical.281 Their distributions are 
distinctly bimodal, again in marked contrast to the normal distribution of the 
general public.282 Similarly, Barber used roll call votes and survey responses to 
determine the ideal points of senators, voters from each party, and all voters.283 
Senators, it turns out, are very distant ideologically from their state’s median 
voter (who is represented only slightly better than a voter chosen at random).284 
They are substantially more aligned with the median voter from their own 
party.285 But “[a]mong both Republicans and Democrats, the ideological 
congruence between senators and the average donor is nearly perfect.”286 
(Bonica’s and Barber’s results are displayed in Figure 3.) 
279 See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 5, at 522-26. 
280 See Bonica, supra note 2, at 26-28; see also Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace 5-9 
(June 25, 2013) (explaining methodology in more detail). 
281 See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 5, at 536-37; Bonica, supra note 2, at 27. 
282 See id; see also supra note 268 (discussing ideal point distribution of public at large). 
283 See Barber, supra note 5, at 8-17. 
284 See id. at 18-19. 
285 See id. at 19-20 
286 Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 
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FIGURE 3: FINDINGS OF PRO-DONOR MISALIGNMENT BY BONICA287 AND 
BARBER288 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
287 Bonica, supra note 2, at 27. 
288 Barber, supra note 5, at 19. 
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Barber’s analysis suggests that the proximity of donors’ and officeholders’ 
views is causal rather than correlational. Since senators represent their donors 
better than their constituents or their co-partisans, the sway of campaign 
contributions must exceed the electoral incentive to appeal to the median voter or 
the partisan urge to please fellow party members.289 Additional evidence along 
these lines comes from Ellis290 and Rhodes and Schaffner,291 both of whom 
found that donors’ preferences remain a significant driver of House members’ 
voting records even after adding controls for voters’ preferences and various 
forms of non-monetary participation. Still more such evidence comes from an 
experimental study recently conducted by Joshua Kalla and David Broockman.292 
They sent e-mails to House members, half from “local constituents” and half 
from “local campaign donors,” asking to meet to discuss environmental issues.293 
Only 5.5% of the constituent e-mails resulted in a meeting with the House 
member or a senior staffer, compared to 18.8% of the donor e-mails.294 More 
work on causation is necessary, but the existing literature does reveal a clear 
connection between campaign giving and misalignment. 
Lastly, the misaligning influence of individual donors may be growing over 
time. As noted earlier, the level of preference misalignment has surged over the 
last few decades (at least with respect to the U.S. House).295 Over the same 
period, the proportion of funds supplied to House candidates by individual 
donors has increased from about 50% to nearly 75%.296 The share of individual 
donors who self-identify as ideologically extreme also has increased from around 
40% to just over 60%.297 These trends may be unrelated, but their juxtaposition 
still is striking. If individual donors are becoming both more vital to candidates 
and more radical in their views, then what we would expect for misalignment is 
exactly what we have witnessed: a steady, seemingly inexorable rise. 
 
C. The Impact of Reform 
289 Barber also suggests that legislators’ preferences might resemble those of donors because both groups 
are more affluent than the non-donating population. Legislators’ bimodal preference distribution might be 
attributable to their own affluence, in other words. See id. at 23-26. This hypothesis warrants further 
investigation, but it cannot fully account for legislators’ bimodality since they are more ideologically extreme 
than affluent non-donors. Cf. Barber, supra note 34, at 15-17 (finding that donors are more ideologically 
extreme than equally politically active non-donors). 
290 See Ellis, Understanding Biases, supra note 222, at 945 (finding that being large donor increases 
alignment with House member even after controlling for voting, political activity, political knowledge, and 
other factors). 
291 See Rhodes & Schaffner, supra note 223, at 36 (finding that donor ideology remains statistically 
significant predictor of House member ideology even after controlling for voter ideology). 
292 See Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Congressional Officials Grant Access Due to Campaign 
Contributions: A Randomized Field Experiment. 
293 See id. at 5-7. 
294 See id. at 9. 
295 See supra notes 244-245 and accompanying text. 
296 See Barber & McCarty, supra note 34, at 31; see also Barber, supra note 34, at 22-24 (showing similar 
increase for state legislative candidates). 
297 See La Raja & Wiltse, supra note 33, at 510. Perhaps relatedly, the share of campaign contributions 
supplied by the richest 0.01% of Americans has skyrocketed from about 10% in 1980 to about 40% today. See 
Bonica et al., supra note 4, at 112. 
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That money in politics is misaligning, however, is only half the story. For the 
alignment interest to be a valid justification for campaign finance regulations, 
these policies actually must be aligning. If their effects are ambiguous (or worse), 
then they lack the tight connection with alignment that is necessary for them to 
be upheld on this basis.298 I conclude this Part, then, by discussing a series of 
very recent studies on the aligning implications of contribution limits on 
individuals, parties, and PACs as well as different kinds of public financing. This 
literature only now is emerging because the techniques for measuring voters’ and 
officeholders’ preferences previously did not exist.299 
But before getting to the studies’ findings, it is important to complete the 
survey, begun above, of campaign funders’ ideological inclinations. It should be 
clear by now that individual donors tend to be ideologically extreme, with starkly 
bimodal ideal point distributions. But what about the other two key sources of 
money in politics, parties and PACs?300 What do their policy preferences look 
like? Starting with parties, La Raja and Schaffner found that their views, at least 
as reflected in their committees’ campaign contributions, are strikingly centrist. 
Parties donate about twice as much money to candidates in the middle of the 
political spectrum as they do to candidates at the edges.301 The distribution of 
party giving by candidate ideology (shown in Figure 4) is distinctly normal, with 
a mode very near the ideological midpoint.302 Of course, the reason for this 
pattern is not that parties prefer moderate over liberal or conservative policies. 
They plainly do not. Rather, the reason is that “parties put a premium on winning 
elections,” and moderate candidates are more likely to prevail at the polls than 
extreme ones.303   
Turning next to PACs, their ideologies (for the most part) are centrist as well. 
Barber304 and Bonica305 both used the positions of the candidates to whom PACs 
contribute to estimate the groups’ ideal points. The resulting distributions were 
normal and unimodal in every case: for PACs that donated to state legislative 
candidates from 1996 to 2012,306 for PACs that donated to federal candidates in 
298 See supra note 213 (discussing stringent scrutiny applied by courts when campaign finance regulations 
are challenged). 
299 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 16, at 303 (noting recent development of these techniques). 
300 In combination, individual donors, parties, and PACs account for essentially all of the contributions 
that candidates receive. See Barber, supra note 34, at 23 (showing trends in these funding sources over time for 
state legislative candidates); Barber & McCarty, supra note 34, at 31 (same for congressional candidates). 
301 See La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 278, at 8, 14 (analyzing party donations to state senate candidates 
from 1996 to 2008). 
302 See id. 
303 Id. at 21; see also, e.g., Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral 
Accountability and House Members’ Voting, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 127, 133 (2002) (finding that House 
incumbents with more extreme voting records are less likely to be reelected); Anthony Gierzynski & David A. 
Breaux, The Financing Role of Parties, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 185, 195-
200 (Joel A. Thompson & Gary F. Moncrief eds., 1998) (finding that parties give most heavily to nonincumbent 
candidates in competitive races). 
304 See Barber, supra note 273, at 9-11; Barber, supra note 34, at 18-22. 
305 See Adam Bonica, Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 295-98 
(2013). 
306 See Barber, supra note 34, at 20. 
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2012 (shown in Figure 4),307 and for PACs that donated to any candidate over the 
1980-2010 period.308 Consistent with these findings, Bonica and Andrew Hall 
both determined that moderate candidates raise more money from PACs than do 
extreme ones. At the state legislative level, moderates raise about $12,000 more 
than liberals and about $7,000 more than conservatives.309 At the U.S. House 
level, the advantage for moderates is about $46,000 over liberals and about 
$69,000 over conservatives.310 PACs’ ideologies, like individuals’, thus are 
reflected in their contributions. 
 
FIGURE 4: FINDINGS ON PARTY AND PAC IDEAL POINTS BY LA RAJA & 
SCHAFFNER311 AND BARBER312 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I noted above that PACs are centrist for the most part. The main exceptions 
to this rule are labor PACs, which are liberal in their orientation,313 and single-
issue PACs (focusing on abortion, taxes, the environment, and the like), which 
307 See Barber, supra note 273, at 11 (finding clearly unimodal distribution for federal contributors but 
slightly bimodal (though still centrist) distribution for state contributors).  
308 See Bonica, supra note 305, at 301. 
309 See Andrew B. Hall, How the Public Funding of Elections Increases Candidate Polarization 20-21 
(Jan. 13, 2014) (considering state legislative candidates over 1992-2010 period). 
310 See Bonica, supra note 305, at 308 (considering U.S. House candidates in 2006 and 2008). 
311 La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 278, at 8. 
312 Barber, supra note 273, at 11. 
313 See id. at 301, 306, 308; Bonica, supra note 280, at 21 (finding that “ideological model” performs 
better than “investor model” in explaining labor PACs’ contributions); see also MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 
273, at 148 (finding that labor PACs mostly contribute to liberal candidates). 
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cluster at the ideological fringes.314 However, these entities’ donations are 
dwarfed by those of corporate and trade PACs, to which the rule applies in 
full.315 Another caveat is that PACs’ centrist ideal points may be the product not 
of actual moderation but rather of tactical giving to politicians from both parties 
aimed at securing access. There is some truth to this story; PACs give more 
heavily to incumbents than to challengers,316 and the variance of the ideologies of 
the candidates to whom PACs contribute is relatively high.317 But Bonica318 and 
McCarty et al.319 both found that this variance is not as high as it would be if 
PACs actually were insensitive to candidates’ views. PACs’ motives for giving 
thus seem to be a mix of acquiring access and supporting likeminded candidates.  
This typology of campaign funders’ ideologies—in which individual donors 
are extreme, and parties and PACs are moderate—explains why certain campaign 
finance regulations are aligning and others are misaligning. In brief, regulations 
that decrease the relative importance of individual donors, or increase the relative 
importance of parties and PACs, are aligning. Conversely, policies that make 
candidates more reliant on individual donors, or less reliant on parties and PACs, 
are misaligning. Policies’ aligning implications follow directly from their impact 
on the composition of candidates’ funds. 
Accordingly, as Barber found, contribution limits on individuals are aligning. 
The lower a state’s individual limit is, the smaller the average individual 
donation is, the more individuals hit the contribution ceiling, and the less 
candidates raise from individuals.320 As a result, a state that switches from no 
individual limit at all to some sort of limit can expect candidates’ ideologies to 
shift toward the center by 0.1 to 0.3 units (on a -2 to 2 scale).321 And a state that 
cuts its individual limit in half can expect candidates’ positions to become 0.02 to 
0.03 units more moderate.322 These effects may seem modest but they actually 
are quite substantial. As Barber wrote about the impact of adopting individual 
314 See Bonica, supra note 305, at 301; La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 278, at 8, 14 (showing bimodal 
pattern for donations by issue groups); see also Michael Jay Barber, Buying Representation: The Incentives, 
Ideology, and Influence of Campaign Contributors in American Politics 12 (Sept. 2014) (finding that 
“ideological groups” including both labor PACs and single-issue PACs have bimodal ideal point distribution). 
315 See Business-Labor-Ideology Split in PAC & Individual Donations to Candidates, Parties Super PACs 
and Outside Spending Groups, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
bigpicture/blio.php?cycle=2012 (last visited Aug. 1, 2014) [hereinafter Business-Labor-Ideology Split] 
(showing that in 2012 cycle, business PACs provided 72% of PAC contributions, compared to 13% for labor 
PACs and 15% for ideological PACs). 
316 See Barber, supra note 273, at 15 (showing that, relative to individual donors, PACs give greater share 
of contributions to incumbents at both state and federal levels); Barber, supra note 34, at 19 (same at state 
level). 
317 See Barber, supra note 273, at 13 (showing that variance is larger for PACs than for individual donors 
at both state and federal levels). 
318 See Bonica, supra note 305, at 302 (showing that variance for most PACs at state and federal levels is 
below threshold that would indicate ideologically random giving). 
319 See MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 273, at 148-50 (same at federal level). 
320 See Barber, supra note 34, at 32-34 (presenting charts displaying each of these relationships). 
321 See id. at 37-39. The larger of these figures is for Republican candidates. 
322 See id. The larger of these figures again is for Republicans. 
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limits in the first place, “This change is large and is slightly bigger than the 
average within state standard deviation of [party] ideal points.”323 
Next, as La Raja and Schaffner determined, contribution limits on parties are 
misaligning. Where such limits are present, state senate candidates receive a 
smaller proportion of their funds from parties, and a larger proportion from 
individual donors.324 For moderate candidates in particular, party limits cause 
their share of party-supplied funds to drop from above 8% to below 4%.325 
Consequently, party limits exert a centrifugal influence on candidates’ positions, 
and the absence of such limits exerts a centripetal influence. Specifically, the 
median Democrat’s ideology is 1.56 units apart from the median Republican’s in 
state legislatures subject to party limits, but only 1.15 units apart in legislatures 
free from such limits.326 Party limits thus are associated with roughly a 35% 
increase in polarization.327 
Analogously, as Barber also found, contribution limits on PACs are 
misaligning too. The tighter a state’s PAC limit is, the smaller the average PAC 
donation is, the more PACs bump up against the contribution ceiling, and the less 
candidates collect from PACs.328 As a result, a state that switches from no PAC 
limit at all to some kind of limit can expect candidates’ ideologies to move away 
from the midpoint by 0.1 to 0.2 units.329 And a state that cuts its PAC limit in half 
can expect candidates’ positions to become 0.005 to 0.02 units more extreme.330 
These effects are sizeable as well: “[M]oving to unlimited PAC contributions 
shifts . . . legislators’ predicted ideal point . . . [by] 70 percent of the standard 
deviation of [party] ideal points.”331 
This leaves us with public financing, two types of which have been analyzed 
for their aligning impact. First, Hall332 and Seth Masket and Michael Miller333 
examined the “clean money” systems used in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine. 
Under these systems, candidates who obtain a certain number of small 
contributions from individual donors then receive block grants that fund the rest 
323 Id. at 37. Moreover, these effects are quite a bit larger in states with more professional legislatures. See 
id. at 38; see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos et al., The Realities of Electoral Reform, 68 VAND. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 40-42) (also finding that individual contribution limits improve district-level 
alignment). 
324 See La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 278, at 16 (showing bar charts to this effect); id. at 19 (confirming 
result with multiple regression model). 
325 See id. at 17. 
326 See Ray La Raja & Brian Schaffner, Want to Reduce Polarization? Give Parties More Money, WASH. 
POST (July 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/21/want-to-reduce-
polarization-give-parties-more-money/. 
327 See id. 
328 See Barber, supra note 34, at 32-34 (presenting charts displaying each of these relationships). 
329 See id. at 37-39. The larger of these figures is for Democratic candidates. 
330 See id. The larger of these figures again is for Democrats. 
331 Id. at 39. These effects are larger for Democrats in states with more professional legislatures, and for 
Republicans in states with less professional legislatures. See id. at 38. 
332 See Hall, supra note 309, at 4-5 (focusing on clean money systems but also considering older (and less 
generous) public financing systems used in Minnesota and Wisconsin). 
333 See Seth E. Masket & Michael G. Miller, Buying Extremists? Public Funding, Parties, and 
Polarization in Maine and Arizona 4-6 (2012) (considering Arizona and Maine).  
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of their campaigns.334 Publicly funded candidates also must abide by spending 
limits and accept no further donations.335 Despite their popularity with reformers, 
these schemes are misaligning because they eliminate most party and PAC 
contributions and make the grants contingent on candidates’ appeal to individual 
donors. According to Hall, the gap between a Democrat and a Republican 
representing the same district (and the same median voter) jumps from 1.16 units 
to 1.51 units under clean money.336 According to Masket and Miller, candidates 
entering the legislature after being elected with clean money often (but not 
always) are more polarized than their privately financed peers.337 
Second, Elizabeth Genn et al.338 and Michael Malbin et al.339 uncovered 
tantalizing clues that New York City’s multiple-match system may be aligning 
(though they did not measure alignment directly). Under New York City’s 
system, contributions up to $175 from individual donors to city council 
candidates are matched six-to-one by the government.340 Publicly funded 
candidates again must comply with spending limits, but they are not barred from 
receiving contributions from parties and PACs.341 That these more centrist 
entities are not excluded from participation is one reason why multiple-match 
may perform differently than clean money.  
The more important reason is that multiple-match transforms the pool of 
individual donors. Genn et al. compared donors to city council candidates to 
donors to New York City’s state house candidates (to whom multiple-match does 
not apply).342 They determined that the former are poorer (with almost the same 
poverty rate as the city as a whole), more racially diverse (with almost the same 
non-white proportion), and less educated (with almost the same share not 
completing high school).343 Multiple-match thus attracts a much more 
representative group of donors than conventional private financing. Similarly, 
Malbin et al. found that city council candidates raise 63% of their funds from 
334 See Hall, supra note 309, at 4-5; Masket & Miller, supra note 333, at 4-6. 
335 See id. 
336 See Hall, supra note 309, at 19. 
337 See Masket & Miller, supra note 333, at 15-19, 30. In particular, this effect holds for Democrats and 
Republicans in Arizona (where the polarizing effects are larger too), and for Republicans in Maine. See also 
Jeffrey J. Harden & Justin H. Kirkland, Do Campaign Donors Influence Polarization? Evidence from Public 
Financing in the American States 23-24 (May 2, 2014) (also finding increase in polarization following 
enactment of reform in Arizona and Maine, but concluding that increase is not statistically significant); Seth E. 
Masket & Michael G. Miller, Does Public Election Funding Create More Extreme Legislators? Evidence from 
Arizona and Maine 9-15 (2014) (re-running earlier analysis and finding statistically significant polarizing effect 
only for Arizona Republicans); Stephanopoulos et al., supra note 323 (manuscript at 40-42) (also finding that 
public financing is misaligning at district level). 
338 See ELISABETH GENN ET AL., DONOR DIVERSITY THROUGH MATCHING FUNDS (2012). 
339 See Michael J. Malbin et al., Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a 
Model for the Nation and States, 11 ELECTION L.J. 3 (2012). 
340 See id. at 5-6. 
341 See id. 
342 See GENN ET AL., supra note 338, at 8-9. More specifically, they compared the Census block groups 
(CBGs) where donors live, because information about the donors themselves was unavailable. 
343 See id. at 14. In particular, 21% of New Yorkers are below the poverty line, compared to 19% of city 
council and 16% of state house small-donor CBGs; 55% of New Yorkers are non-white, compared to 54% of 
city council and 39% of state house small-donor CBGs; and 28% of New Yorkers have not finished high 
school, compared to 26% of city council and 22% of state house small-donor CBGs. See id. 
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donors who give less than $250.344 In contrast, U.S. Senate candidates raise only 
14% of their funds from such donors, U.S. House candidates raise only 8%, and 
New York state legislative candidates just 7%.345 This result also suggests that 
donors to city council candidates, unlike most other individual donors in 
American politics, may be a centripetal rather than a centrifugal force. 
 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALIGNMENT 
 
A key lesson from this empirical evidence is that alignment is affected in 
different ways by different policies. Unlike interests such as anti-corruption, anti-
distortion, and equality, which tend to be asserted in defense of every kind of 
campaign finance regulation,346 alignment is an available justification only in 
limited circumstances. In this Part, I explore what exactly these circumstances 
are. I explore, that is, what the doctrinal implications of the alignment approach 
are for the main types of campaign finance regulation: contribution limits, 
expenditure limits, and public financing.347 In this discussion, I draw heavily on 
the political science studies detailed above. But I also rely on informed 
speculation where actual empirics are unavailable. 
Three more points before beginning this analysis: First, that a given policy is 
misaligning, or neutral in its impact, does not mean that it is necessarily 
unconstitutional. It only means that the alignment interest cannot be used to 
justify the policy. Quite possibly, other interests still can be invoked in the 
policy’s defense. I focus here on the doctrinal consequences that would follow 
from judicial recognition of the alignment interest. But I do not mean to slight 
other interests whose consequences may be quite different. Second, the 
constitutionality of a given policy hinges on both its connection to alignment and 
the magnitude of the burden it imposes on First Amendment rights. I only 
consider the link to alignment here. But it is worth noting that a heavy rights 
burden triggers more stringent judicial scrutiny,348 which in turn may lead to the 
voiding of a policy that is aligning (just not aligning enough). 
344 See Malbin et al., supra note 339, at 15 (including in figure matching funds received from city). 
345 See id. Just below New York City on the list is Minnesota, where state legislative candidates raise 60% 
of their funds from small donors. Minnesota has the most generous of the first generation of public financing 
systems, offering donors a rebate of up to $50 for their campaign contributions, as well as block grants to 
participating candidates. See id. 
346 In particular, the anti-corruption interest has been invoked in essentially every Supreme Court case 
since Buckley. See supra Section I.B. 
347 I do not discuss disclosure requirements because there is no available evidence on their aligning effects. 
They also rest on sturdier legal ground than other regulations thanks to their connection to the government’s 
distinct informational interest. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 367-71 (2010) (discussing this 
interest). I also do not discuss measures outside the campaign finance context that might both improve 
alignment and burden First Amendment rights. There is only so much ground a given paper can cover. 
348 See supra note 213 and accompanying text (noting that standard of review is stricter for expenditure 
limits, which Court views as particularly burdensome, than for contribution limits). Assuming that alignment is 
a compelling interest, the main reason why the standard of review matters is that strict scrutiny typically 
requires a regulation to be the least restrictive means for achieving the interest. A plaintiff thus could try to 
show that there exist less burdensome but equally aligning measures that could be enacted. However, this 
showing would not be easy. The evidence on the aligning effects of most electoral regulations is either mixed or 
nonexistent, and many of these regulations burden constitutional rights as well.  
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And third, this Part’s doctrinal conclusions are provisional in several 
respects. Most obviously, they hinge on very recent empirical studies whose 
findings may turn out to be incorrect. If individual donors are not ideologically 
extreme, or if parties and PACs are not relatively moderate, then very different 
results would follow. Even if the studies are accurate at present, actors’ views 
may shift over time. One can imagine a future world, not too unlike our own, in 
which aroused centrists are the largest individual donors, and parties and PACs 
choose to prioritize ideology over electability.349 Lastly, laws that differentiate by 
entity may be vulnerable to manipulation. For instance, if individuals were 
subject to tighter limits than parties or PACs, they could channel more of their 
funds through the latter groups. The laxer restrictions on the groups then would 
have to be revisited to take into account their greater extremism.350 
 
A. Contribution Limits 
 
Contribution limits are perhaps the most familiar kind of campaign finance 
regulation. They restrict contributions to candidates by individuals, parties, 
PACs, corporations, unions, and other entities.351 At the federal level, individuals 
can donate up to $5,200 per candidate per cycle.352 The equivalent figure is 
$10,000 both for parties and for PACs, while direct corporate and union 
contributions are banned.353 The aggregate limit of $123,200 on individual 
donations per cycle recently was struck down in McCutcheon.354 At the state 
level, contribution limits vary dramatically from one jurisdiction (and funding 
source) to another.355 Individual limits, for instance, range from $320 in Montana 
to no cap at all in a dozen states.356 Similarly, corporate and union limits run the 
gamut from outright prohibition to no restriction whatsoever.357 
Beginning with individual contribution limits, they generally would be valid 
under the alignment approach for the simple reason that they generally are 
aligning. The empirical evidence shows that individual donors hold ideologically 
extreme views and that politicians mirror these views almost perfectly.358 Barber 
also found that restrictions on individual contributions cause politicians’ 
349 Though it is worth noting that the relative ideological positions of individuals, parties, and PACs have 
not varied greatly in the past, see Barber, supra note 34, at 14-16, and that there are good theoretical reasons to 
expect each entity to continue to hold the views that it does today. 
350 Though it is unclear that parties or PACs would change their giving patterns if they received more 
money from ideologically extreme individuals. The groups’ incentives to contribute to more moderate 
candidates would remain in place. 
351 They also restrict contributions to some of the entities that themselves are restricted in how much they 
may give to candidates. 
352 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2012); Contribution Limits 2013-14, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml (last visited Aug. 1, 2014). 
353 See id.  
354 See id.; see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
355 See Contribution Limits – An Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 3, 2011), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/campaign-contribution-limits-overview.aspx. 
356 See id. 
357 See id. 
358 See supra Section III.B. 
                                                 
 
Aligning Campaign Finance 50 
positions to move toward the center (though further confirmation of this finding 
would be helpful).359 To be sure, one can conceive of scenarios in which 
individual limits would not be aligning—if individual donors in a given 
jurisdiction were ideologically moderate, if they gave for reasons other than 
candidates’ ideological proximity to them, or if candidates were not motivated to 
maximize their campaign resources. But there is no indication that these 
scenarios are common in modern American politics. The connection between 
individual limits and alignment thus is strong. 
Next, contribution limits on parties typically could not be sustained under the 
alignment approach. La Raja and Schaffner determined that parties give more 
heavily to moderate candidates than to extreme ones.360 They also found that 
restrictions on party contributions are linked to about a 35% increase in 
legislative polarization (though further confirmation again would be useful).361 
True, the motivation for the parties’ giving may be strategic rather than 
ideological. The parties may want to win more elections by supporting more 
moderate candidates, not to see more moderate policy actually enacted.362 But the 
parties’ intent is irrelevant for present purposes. It is the effect that counts here, 
and the impact of party limits is plainly misaligning. 
The story is somewhat more complicated for contribution limits on PACs. 
According to Bonica, corporate and trade PACs usually have moderate ideal 
points.363 According to Barber, restrictions on PAC contributions (most of which 
are made by corporate and trade groups) cause politicians’ positions to shift away 
from the center.364 So far, so good; contribution limits on corporate and trade 
PACs, like such limits on parties, are not aligning and so could not be upheld 
under the alignment approach. But there are other types of PACs too, and their 
ideal points are not moderate. In particular, Bonica determined that labor PACs 
are quite liberal, and that single-issue PACs are highly bimodal in their 
stances.365 Contribution limits on these PACs might well be aligning, as they 
could reduce politicians’ incentive to veer left in the case of labor PACs, or 
toward either extreme in the case of single-issue PACs.366 The doctrinal fate of 
PAC limits thus might vary by PAC category. 
This conclusion may be unsettling to some readers. Are PACs not a threat to 
the integrity of the electoral system, rather than a largely benign presence? And 
of the various types of PACs, are corporate and trade PACs not the most 
359 See Barber, supra note 34, at 37-39. 
360 See La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 278, at 8, 14. 
361 See La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 326. 
362 See supra note 303 and accompanying text. 
363 See Bonica, supra note 305, at 301; Bonica, supra note 280, at 21. 
364 See Barber, supra note 34, at 37-39. 
365 See Bonica, supra note 305, at 301, 306, 308; Bonica, supra note 280, at 21; see also MCCARTY ET AL., 
supra note 273, at 148; La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 278, at 8, 14. 
366 Alas, this prediction has not yet been tested by political scientists. Another hypothesis that has yet to be 
investigated is that contribution limits on corporations and unions have the same aligning implications, 
respectively, as limits on corporate and union PACs. This hypothesis seems reasonable because corporate PACs 
raise almost all of their money from corporate employees, and union PACs obtain almost all of their funds from 
union members. 
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dangerous—the very epitome of big money? There are several responses to this 
unease. First, some corporate and trade PACs do have extreme ideal points and 
donate more money to extreme candidates.367 PACs in the construction and 
energy sectors, for instance, are skewed distinctly to the right.368 If their 
contributions were limited, the effect likely would be aligning. Second, corporate 
and trade PACs may undermine the electoral system through mechanisms other 
than misalignment. Their donations may buy them special access to lawmakers 
and special influence over the shaping of public policy. These are troublesome 
results even if they do not produce measurable noncongruence. And third, it is 
possible that the democratic threat posed by business influence has been 
overstated. Corporate and trade PACs are nobody’s idea of altruistic groups 
sacrificing for the public good. But their relative moderation in a time of surging 
polarization may be valuable. 
Another potentially worrisome implication of this analysis is that the validity 
of contribution limits may vary based on the identity of the entity being limited. 
Restrictions on individual contributions may be lawful, for example, while 
restrictions on party or PAC contributions may not be. Does this not amount to 
illegal viewpoint discrimination? Again, there are several replies to this 
objection. First, the essence of viewpoint discrimination is action taken by a 
jurisdiction because it “fears, dislikes, or disagrees with” the “substantive 
content” of a given message.369 But if a jurisdiction limits certain entities’ 
donations in order to promote alignment, then the rationale for the limitation is 
the promotion of alignment—not any fear, dislike, or disagreement with the 
entities’ views. It also is not the entities’ views that concern a jurisdiction seeking 
to improve alignment, but rather the views’ divergence from the position of the 
median voter. Location along an ideological spectrum is distinct from the 
substantive content that the government is prohibited from taking into account. 
Second, it is unlikely that courts would consider contribution limits to be 
vulnerable to a viewpoint discrimination challenge in the first place. Any 
particular restriction treats identically all donors whom it covers. A contribution 
limit on individuals, for instance, in no way distinguishes between moderate and 
extreme persons. At the aggregate level too, considering the full set of limits in 
effect in a given jurisdiction, the policies may differentiate by entity, but they do 
not do so by viewpoint. And under the Court’s precedent, speaker-based 
367 See Bonica, supra note 305, at 306 (showing that PACs in certain sectors give more money to extreme 
Democrats and/or Republicans relative to baseline candidate). In addition, PACs’ overall moderation may mask 
particular positions (quite possibly on the issues that matter most to the PACs) that are very different from those 
of the general public. 
368 See id. 
369 Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 (2014). Or as Elana Kagan has put it, “Whenever hostility toward 
ideas as such . . . has played some part in effecting a restriction on speech, the restriction is irretrievably 
tainted.” Elana Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment 
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 431 (1996) (emphasis added). “In contrast . . . when the government has 
restricted ideas only as and when they bear harmful consequences[,] the government’s purposes support 
sustaining the action.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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regulations are subject only to review for reasonableness, in contrast to the strict 
scrutiny that applies to viewpoint-based regulations.370 
Lastly, while the contribution limits that best promote alignment may vary by 
entity, existing limits do so too. At the federal level, as noted earlier, the donation 
ceiling is $5,200 for individuals, $10,000 for parties and PACs, and $0 for 
corporations and unions.371 Most states also specify different limits for different 
entities.372 The reasons for this divergent treatment have not been disclosed, but 
they presumably include judgments about the relative threat posed by different 
funding sources. Accordingly, if the optimal pro-alignment policy set may be 
challenged on viewpoint discrimination grounds, then so too may be the status 
quo. Both the alignment approach and the status quo distinguish among entities 
based on their capacity to undermine key democratic values. But if the status quo 
is secure from such attack—as suggested by the lack of any campaign finance 
regulation struck down for discriminating by viewpoint—then the alignment 
approach should be safe as well.373 
 
B. Expenditure Limits 
 
Limits on electoral expenditures are a second kind of campaign finance 
regulation, albeit one more important in theory than in practice. Congress’s 1974 
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act included spending limits on 
individuals, groups, candidates, and parties.374 But all of these limits were struck 
down in Buckley on the grounds that they burdened First Amendment rights more 
heavily than contribution limits, while not preventing corruption as effectively.375 
Spending bans on corporations and unions survived Buckley and also were 
upheld in Austin.376 But they too fell by the wayside in Citizens United.377 At 
present, no form of expenditure limit, at either the state or federal level, is 
permitted.378 
Because few spending limits have been in place since Buckley, there is little 
direct evidence on their aligning implications. Political scientists cannot easily 
370 See Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 267 (2012) (observing that 
“speaker- and medium-based discrimination appears not to be suspect in itself”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content 
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 247 (1983) (noting that “the Court sharply 
distinguishe[s] speaker-based from viewpoint-based restrictions and . . . test[s] speaker-based restrictions by a 
standard of reasonableness”). 
371 See supra notes 352-353 and accompanying text. 
372 See supra notes 355-357 and accompanying text. 
373 A related First Amendment concern may be that the alignment approach seems, at first glance, to 
permit the silencing of dissenters seeking to persuade the public of their unorthodox views. In fact, the approach 
does no such thing. Either dissenting speech fails to persuade, in which case it is irrelevant, or it does persuade, 
in which case people’s preferences shift and there is a new benchmark with which governmental outputs should 
align. Speech never can be regulated under the approach because of its impact on the public. 
374 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976). 
375 See id. at 39-59. 
376 See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668-69 (1990). 
377 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371-72 (2010). 
378 Prior to Citizens United, bans on corporate and union expenditures existed in about half the states. See 
Life After Citizens United, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 4, 2011), http://ncsl.org/legislatures-
elections/elections/citizens-united-and-the-states.aspx. 
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assess policies that have not been enacted. But it still is possible to make some 
educated guesses as to how different types of spending limits would fare under 
the alignment approach, using the data that is available. One reasonable 
hypothesis is that campaign funders exhibit the same ideological inclinations 
whether they use their funds on contributions or expenditures. In other words, 
individuals, unions, and single-issue groups are ideologically extreme (and prefer 
extreme candidates) whether they are donating money or spending it themselves. 
Likewise, parties and businesses are relatively moderate (and prefer moderate 
candidates) no matter how they are deploying their resources. 
Some support for this hypothesis comes from the identities of the individuals 
who gave money to Super PACs in the 2012 election. (Super PACs, again, may 
fundraise and spend in unlimited quantities because they do not contribute 
directly to candidates.379) According to the Center for Responsive Politics, more 
than 80% of the individuals who donated to Restore Our Future, the Super PAC 
supporting Mitt Romney’s candidacy, also gave the maximum possible amount 
to Romney’s own campaign.380 The proportions were similar for other 
presidential candidates.381 Donors to Super PACs and donors to actual campaigns 
thus were the very same people. Analogously, McCarty et al. found that in the 
2002 election—the last before the use of soft money to pay for parties’ unlimited 
issue advertising was banned—almost all large soft money donors held extreme 
views.382 The same pattern held in 2004 when funds flowed to other groups that 
also could engage in unlimited issue advertising. “The major contributors to 
[these groups were] exactly the same people who made large soft money 
contributions.”383 
Data from the 2012 election further suggests that corporations are relatively 
moderate and unions are liberal in their spending choices. Free for the first time 
to tap their treasuries in federal elections, corporations allocated just $75 million 
to independent expenditures.384 This sum amounted to about 1% of total federal 
outlays,385 and contrasts sharply with the $365 million that corporate PACs gave 
379 See supra notes 3, 104. Super PACs have become the vehicle of choice for funders who would like to 
make independent expenditures. Relatively few funders choose to make such expenditures themselves. Of 
course, as with conventional PACs, it is possible that Super PACs’ spending priorities may diverge from those 
of their funders. 
380 See Double-Duty Donors, Part II: Large Numbers of Wealthy Donors Hit Legal Limit on Giving to 
Candidates, Turn to Presidential Super PACs in Continuing Trend, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Feb. 21, 2012), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/02/double-duty-donors-part-ii-large-nu.html. Unfortunately, this study 
only covered donations to candidate-linked Super PACs in 2011. More research is needed on donors to the 
entire array of Super PACs over the whole election cycle. 
381 See id. 
382 See MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 273, at 155-58, 162. 
383 See id. at 158. These groups were organized under Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, and 
included America Comes Together, a sort of shadow campaign for Democratic nominee John Kerry. 
384 See Bonica, supra note 2, at 10. Technically, corporations and unions also were able to make 
independent expenditures in part of the 2010 cycle, since Citizens United was decided in January 2010. See 
Diana Dwyre, After Citizens United and SpeechNow.org: Considering the Consequences of New Campaign 
Finance Rules 13 (Sept. 1-4, 2011) (finding that corporations gave just $0.05 million to Super PACs in 2010, 
and unions $10.9 million).  
385 See supra note 1 (noting total federal spending of $7.3 billion in 2012). 
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to candidates.386 Such limited spending is what one would expect if corporations 
are mostly centrist entities seeking to ruffle few feathers and maintain their 
access to officeholders. Unions, on the other hand, took full advantage of their 
newfound flexibility in 2012. They devoted $105 million to independent 
expenditures,387 compared to $66 million in labor PAC contributions to 
candidates.388 Such aggressive exploitation of new funding opportunities is what 
one would expect from highly ideological actors.389 
That campaign funders have the same policy preferences no matter how they 
use their money, however, does not prove that expenditures are linked to 
alignment itself. For this conclusion to follow, expenditures also must exert an 
influence on candidates. On this point, a reasonable hypothesis is that 
expenditures indeed affect candidates—but not quite to the same extent as 
contributions. Candidates tend to hold the same positions as their donors, either 
because they shift their views in the donors’ direction to attract funding, or 
because only candidates who share the donors’ views in the first place are 
financially viable.390 These mechanisms also seem likely to produce convergence 
between candidates and those who spend on their behalf, only not to the same 
degree because a donated dollar is more valuable to a candidate than an 
independently spent dollar. The candidate has full control over the donated 
dollar, while the spent dollar may not be used precisely as the candidate would 
have liked. 
Unfortunately, I am unaware of any empirical evidence on the impact of 
expenditures on candidates. The Court, though, seems convinced that candidates 
are not indifferent to money that is spent on their behalf. In McCutcheon, the 
Court gave an example of a candidate faced with a choice between $26,000 in 
contributions and $500,000 in supportive expenditures.391 The Court was 
confident the candidate would prefer the latter. The candidate’s lack of control 
over the spending may “‘undermine[] the value of the expenditure’”—“[b]ut 
probably not by 95 percent.”392 Many scholars concur with the Court. Briffault, 
for instance, has argued that the “prospect of . . . extremely large and legally 
unlimited donations to an allied Super PAC . . . is at least as likely to affect the . . 
. decisions of elected officials as the relatively paltry amounts that candidates’ 
personal campaign committees are allowed to receive.”393 Likewise, Cain has 
386 See Business-Labor-Ideology Split, supra note 315. 
387 See Bonica, supra note 2, at 11. 
388 See Business-Labor-Ideology Split, supra note 315. 
389 Of course, this data is merely suggestive of corporations’ and unions’ ideological inclinations. 
Corporations could be extreme despite devoting only a small share of their funds to independent spending, and 
unions could be moderate despite devoting a large share. This is an area where further research plainly would be 
valuable. 
390 See supra Section III.B. 
391 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1454 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
392 Id. (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010)); see also FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 
480, 498 (noting that “absence of prearrangement and coordination” of expenditure “undermines” but does not 
eliminate “value of the expenditure to the candidate”). 
393 Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1692 (2012). 
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commented that a candidate will not “feel any less obligated to a large 
independent spender than to a large contributor.”394 
If spenders and donors are equally ideological, and if spending and donating 
have similar effects on candidates, then spending and donating limits would have 
the same legal status under the alignment approach. They would rise or fall 
together for each category of campaign funder.395 Accordingly, spending limits 
on individuals, unions, and single-issue groups (all ideologically extreme funding 
sources) generally would be valid because they generally would be aligning.396 
On the other hand, spending limits on parties and businesses (both relatively 
moderate sources) typically could not be sustained by reference to alignment.397 
The doctrinal distinction between contributions and expenditures, a cornerstone 
of campaign finance law since Buckley, thus would crumble under the alignment 
approach. Money would be treated the same whether it is donated or spent.  
 
C. Public Financing  
 
Public financing is the final major category of campaign finance regulation, 
and it can be divided in turn into three types of policies. First, several states 
provide block grants to participating candidates who receive a sufficient number 
of small individual donations.398 In some cases, these grants are relatively stingy, 
and candidates may continue fundraising until they hit the spending limits that 
accompany the public funds.399 But in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine (the 
clean money states), the grants are meant to pay for campaigns in full, and 
candidates may collect no further contributions after accepting them.400  
Second, numerous jurisdictions at the federal, state, and local levels 
encourage individual donations through matching programs and tax benefits. The 
394 Cain, supra note 170, at 43; see also, e.g., Cole, supra note 188, at 272; Richard L. Hasen, Three 
Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One Right One) to Campaign Finance Reform, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
21, 33 (2014) (observing that “$20 million in a Super PAC supporting Member of Congress X is less bad (but 
still bad) than $20 million in Member X’s campaign account”); Michael S. Kang, The Year of the Super PAC, 
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902, 1914 (2013). 
395 As for spending limits on candidates, they could not be upheld on the basis of alignment. Candidates’ 
own spending cannot induce them to move in any particular ideological direction. Furthermore, the earlier 
discussion of viewpoint discrimination challenges, see supra notes 369-372 and accompanying text, applies 
here as well. Spending limits that distinguish between different entities might be subject to such attacks, but for 
the reasons stated earlier, I do not believe that the attacks would succeed. 
396 This conclusion also likely would hold for PACs, Super PACs, or other groups funded by these actors. 
And unlike under Lessig’s model, there would be no reason to distinguish between individual expenditures 
(whose restriction Lessig would bar) and individual contributions to Super PACs (which Lessig would allow to 
be curtailed). See Lessig, supra note 165, at 20-21. If funds from individual donors are misaligning, they could 
be regulated under the alignment approach no matter what form they take. 
397 Again, this conclusion likely would hold for PACs, Super PACs, or other groups funded by these 
entities. 
398 See Michael G. Miller, After the GAO Report: What Do We Know About Public Election Funding? 3-4 
(Apr. 11, 2011); Public Financing of Campaigns: An Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 
23, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/public-financing-of-campaigns-overview.aspx 
[hereinafter Public Financing Overview].  
399 See id.  
400 See id. A few more states employ clean money systems for statewide (as opposed to legislative) 
elections. See id. 
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federal government matches contributions up to $250 to qualifying candidates in 
presidential primary elections.401 About half a dozen states offer tax credits or 
deductions for donations, typically up to $50 or $100.402 And cities such as Los 
Angeles and Oakland have one-to-one matches similar to the federal 
government’s,403 while New York City employs a six-to-one match for 
contributions up to $175.404 Third, another ten or so states provide block grants to 
political parties.405 These (quite modest) grants usually are paid for by income 
tax check-offs ranging from $1 to $5 that enable taxpayers to steer funds to the 
party of their choice.406 
Of these policies, the doctrinal fate of block grants triggered by individual 
donations is clearest. These measures generally could not be upheld under the 
alignment approach because they generally are misaligning. Hall found that 
candidates’ positions diverge from the ideological center after clean money 
systems (or their less generous predecessors) are adopted.407 Likewise, Masket 
and Miller determined that candidates elected with clean money often are more 
polarized than their peers who rely on private financing.408 Both studies 
attributed their findings to candidates’ need to appeal to ideologically extreme 
individual donors in order to qualify for public funds. 
To be sure, there may be compelling rationales for these regulations other 
than alignment. For example, the very terminology of “clean” money suggests 
that it is less corrupting than the usual “dirty” cash.409 Political scientists also 
have observed striking increases in competitiveness in the clean money states.410 
Moreover, it may be possible to revise the regulations in ways that make them 
more aligning. For instance, if block grants were offered automatically to 
candidates (as they are in presidential general elections411), then candidates 
would not have to woo polarized individual donors. Alternatively, if candidates 
had to collect contributions from voters from both parties (and from independents 
too) before qualifying for grants, then their donor bases would be less skewed 
401 See Public Funding of Presidential Election, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (Apr. 2014), 
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/pubfund.shtml [hereinafter Presidential Public Funding].  
402 See Public Financing Overview, supra note 398. 
403 See STEVEN M. LEVIN, KEEPING IT CLEAN: PUBLIC FINANCING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 116-18 
(2006); see also Public Financing Overview, supra note 398 (showing that several states also offer matching 
funds to candidates for statewide office). 
404 See supra note 340 and accompanying text. 
405 See Public Financing Overview, supra note 398. 
406 See id. 
407 See Hall, supra note 309, at 19. 
408 See Masket & Miller, supra note 333, at 15-19, 30. And if Harden and Kirkland are correct that clean 
money systems have no impact on polarization, then they still are not aligning and so cannot be sustained under 
the alignment approach. See Harden & Kirkland, supra note 337, at 23-24. 
409 Cf. Fair Facts, PUB. CAMPAIGN, http://www.publicampaign.org/fair-facts (last visited Aug. 1, 2014) 
(claiming that clean money will end solicitation of “well heeled donors and lobbyists” as well as government 
“bought and paid for by special interests”). 
410 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 309, at 12-15; Neil Malhotra, The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral 
Competition: Evidence from Arizona and Maine, 8 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 263, 273-77 (2008); Miller, supra 
note  398, at 19. 
411 See Presidential Public Funding, supra note 401. 
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toward the ideological fringes. Reformers who value alignment should consider 
such tweaks. 
Next, most of the programs aimed at spurring individual donations also could 
not be sustained under the alignment approach. The problem here, though, is not 
that these programs are misaligning, but rather that they seem to have little 
impact on the composition of the donor pool. According to a series of surveys, 
donors in presidential elections (in which contribution matching is available) are 
just as unrepresentative of the general population as donors in congressional 
elections (in which it is not).412 Similarly, at the state level, candidates raise a 
median of 15% of their funds from small donors in states offering tax credits or 
deductions.413 The equivalent figure in states that do not offer such incentives is a 
nearly identical 17%.414 Since these programs do not meaningfully alter the 
donor pool, it is hard to see how they could affect the level of alignment.  
The main exception to this pessimistic conclusion is New York City’s 
multiple-match system. Malbin et al. determined that city council candidates 
collect 63% of their funds from small donors, the highest such figure in the 
nation.415 Likewise, Genn et al. concluded that donors to city council candidates 
are very similar to the city’s general population in terms of race, income, and 
education.416 If these donors also are ideologically representative (a proposition 
that has yet to be tested), then they would exert an aligning influence on the 
candidates who seek their support. In this case, New York City’s system, unlike 
most efforts to stimulate contributions, would be valid under the alignment 
approach.  
So too (most likely) would be voucher schemes of the sort proposed by 
Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres,417 Hasen,418 and Lessig.419 All of these schemes 
would grant to each voter a voucher of a set dollar amount, which the voter then 
could disburse to candidates as she saw fit. If almost all voters took advantage of 
their vouchers, then the donor population would closely resemble the general 
population, and the vouchers would create powerful aligning incentives for 
candidates.420 Even if voucher use was more uneven, it is doubtful that the donor 
population would be more unrepresentative than it is today, meaning that the 
vouchers still would be aligning relative to the status quo. 
412 Compare Wilcox et al., supra note 263, at 68 (analyzing presidential donors), and IPDI STUDY, supra 
note 264, at 12 (same), with FRANCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 28 (analyzing congressional donors). 
413 See Malbin et al., supra note 339, at 15 (including data for five of these states (Arkansas, Minnesota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Oregon), of which Arkansas is median). As noted earlier, Minnesota’s rebate program 
seems unusually effective at promoting small donor participation. See supra note 345. 
414 See id. (showing that Maryland is median such state). 
415 See id. 
416 See GENN ET AL., supra note 338, at 14. 
417 See BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE 181-222 (2002). 
418 See Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy? An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of 
Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996). 
419 See Lessig, supra note 166, at 66. 
420 For the reasons discussed earlier, even perfect participation in the voucher system would not guarantee 
alignment. See supra Section II.C (explaining why alignment is distinct from equality of voter influence). 
                                                 
 
Aligning Campaign Finance 58 
Finally, though they have not yet been studied by scholars, the existing block 
grants to the parties seem too small to have much of an effect on alignment. 
These grants often are used to cover some of the costs of state party 
conventions.421 They rarely are redistributed to the parties’ actual candidates in 
substantial sums.422 However, Lowenstein’s proposal that much larger amounts 
of public money be provided to the parties, which then could channel the funds to 
the candidates of their choice,423 likely would pass muster under the alignment 
approach. Since the parties’ first priority is winning elections, and since moderate 
candidates are more likely to prevail than extreme ones, the parties probably 
would allocate most of their resources to relatively centrist contestants. This is 
how the parties deploy their funds today,424 and there is no obvious reason why 
their tactics would change if their coffers swelled with public money. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Campaign finance law is in crisis. In a series of unfortunate decisions, the 
Supreme Court has rejected state interests such as anti-distortion and equality, 
while narrowing the anti-corruption interest to its quid pro quo core. This core 
cannot sustain the bulk of campaign finance regulation. As a result, expenditure 
limits, aggregate contribution limits, and certain public financing programs all 
have been struck down by the Court. If any meaningful rules are to survive, a 
new interest capable of justifying them must be found. 
Alignment is just such an interest. The congruence of voters’ preferences 
with key governmental outputs is a compelling objective because it accords with 
core democratic values. Indeed, the Court has said as much on several occasions. 
Alignment also is a goal that neither is forbidden by general First Amendment 
principles nor is duplicative of the interests the Court already has rebuffed. And 
if it were to be recognized by the Court, it would result in much (though not all) 
campaign finance regulation being upheld. Specifically, policies that curb the 
influence of polarized individual funders would be valid. But measures that 
burden ideologically moderate funders, such as parties and PACs, could not be 
sustained on this basis. 
What are the odds that the current Court would adopt the alignment 
approach? They are extremely low. The Court’s hostility to campaign finance 
regulation is driven above all by its libertarian theory of the First Amendment, 
not by its inability to identify suitable interests. But it still is worthwhile to make 
421 See LEVIN, supra note 403, at 68; Public Financing Overview, supra note 398. 
422 See id. 
423 See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 18 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 351-54 (1989) (recommending that national parties be provided with enough funds to 
support fifty strong challengers nationwide); cf. PETER J. WALLISON & JOEL M. GORA, BETTER PARTIES, 
BETTER GOVERNMENT: A REALISTIC PROGRAM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2009) (also arguing for 
larger role for parties in funding of campaigns). In foreign democracies, it is common for parties to receive large 
sums of public funding. See Stephen Ansolabehere, Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett and the Problem of 
Campaign Finance, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 46. 
424 See supra notes 301-303, 324-327 and accompanying text. 
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the case for alignment. For one thing, the Court may realize that some regulation 
serves an end whose significance it has acknowledged in cases such as 
McCutcheon. For another, a future Court may not be as uninterested in new 
rationales for reform as this one. The alignment approach offers a receptive 
majority a roadmap for upholding policies without reversing the Court’s existing 
precedents. Finally, alignment deserves recognition because it is a concept that 
undeniably is intertwined with money in politics. In campaign finance law, as in 
all law, it is important to be clear about the values that are threatened by 
unregulated activity and furthered by regulation. And of these values, few are as 
vital as alignment. 
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